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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: Transportation and Handling of Dangerous Cargoes in
Port Areas; The Weaknesses of Existing International
and Estonian Regulations
Degree:

MSc

The aim of the dissertation is to introduce different aspects concerning
dangerous cargo, its handling and transportation in port areas. As this topic is wide,
the dissertation covers many areas.
To emphasize the importance of dangerous cargo transportation in world
trade, the overview of quantities of this type of cargo handled in different port all
around the world is given. The author also explains the importance to keep statistics
over movement of dangerous cargo and shows how collected information helps to
increase safety and public awareness.
The definition “dangerous cargo” contains hundreds of substances with
different characteristics. The dissertation explains physical and chemical criteria
which makes handling of these substances dangerous.
To show that dangerous cargo is dangerous, accidents through the history is
described. As during last decades different methods have been worked out to
decrease the risk of possible incidents. The author analyses the role of management,
technology and training in avoidance of accidents. Large part of the dissertation is
dedicated to analyses of the international and national (Estonian) legislation
concerning handling and transport of dangerous goods in port areas. In Estonian
chapter main violations of enforcing existing regulations in terminals are showed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Topic description
By its nature, shipping, especially transport of harmful cargoes, can be called
the second most dangerous industry after the nuclear power industry (Rawson, 1994).
Only vessels have the capability to dump half a million tonnes of dangerous liquid
substances into the sea with a single accident which can cause both environment
catastrophe and death of tens or even hundreds of people. In 1998, five billion tonnes
of cargo was carried by ships around the world. According to the IMO,
approximately 50% of these goods can be classified as hazardous. 100 thousand
chemical substances are defined as dangerous which, if wrongly handled, can cause
death of people, environmental disaster or destruction of property. It is impossible to
predict the impact of the accidents with dangerous substances as all chemicals
behaving depend on their characteristics, quantity and weather conditions.
A port is an area where people should take into consideration the danger of
transport, handling and storing dangerous cargo. It is a place where not only large
quantities, but also different substances, are stored which if mixed may be induce
accidents. As port is a meeting point of different modes of transportation then both
land and sea transport safety regulations must be taken very carefully into
consideration. History shows that there is a need to do that. The five of ten biggest
man- made explosions happened in port areas (Compton, 1999). According to
statistics most maritime accidents related to dangerous cargo happen in harbours.
Estonian ports play quite a significant role in liquid dangerous cargo
shipments in the Baltic Sea area being a link between Russia and the world. Estonia
geographical vicinity to Finland gives the country the possibility to be a shortest and
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quickest way between northern Scandinavia and the Baltic States. Estonian ports are
mainly transhipment ports. It means the cargo moves to and from the other states by
rail and road. The use of intermodal transport makes important not to follow only
regulations specified to maritime but also to land transport. In addition to the
economic importance, the Baltic Sea is a unique water area in the world where
freshwater and marine organisms live side by side. Even a medium size chemical or
oil spill can cause long term pollution with severe consequences as water exchange
between the Baltic Sea and the North Sea takes 35 years (Liiv& Marksoo, 1998). As
the country is an IMO member state and a main candidate to join the European
Union, it is very important to know the legislation of both institutions and examine
its impacts on Estonian maritime activities.
As the author of the dissertation is interested in safety of transportation of oil and
its products as this is most quickly developing trade area in Estonian ports then quite
a significant part of the dissertation is dedicated to that area. The author’s aim is to
give an overview of handling of dangerous good, possible threats that exist around
this topic and comparison of existing IMO, EU and Estonian rules.
The objectives of the dissertation are following:
Firstly, to give an overview of the statistics of dangerous cargo movement in
different parts of the world and to show how to use this information. Secondly, to
describe different type of dangerous substances and show what kind of physical and
chemical features make them dangerous to people and the environment. Thirdly, to
emphasise the main reasons of accidents and “near misses” and give ideas how to
avoid them. Fourthly, to analyse the IMO and the EU legislation concerning the
transport, handling and storing of hazardous materials. Do the existing rules decrease
the risk of accidents? What are the differences between IMO and EU legislation?
Why does the European Commission demand more than IMO? These and other
questions will be answered in the dissertation. Finally, the situation of handling of
dangerous cargoes in Estonia is introduced and weaknesses in the current system are
emphasised.
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1.2 Research plan
As the dissertation “Transport and handling of dangerous cargoes in port areas;
the weaknesses of existing international and Estonian regulations“ consists of
statistics, facts, regulations analyses and a description of implementing them,
different research methods were used.

When statistics and legislation can be

analysed behind the computer screen or on the basis of the literature, then the
implementation of regulations can be checked only in the middle of port operations.
For that reason the author of the dissertation spent his time in different libraries
reading specific literature, but also visited different institutions and stevedore
companies. Estonian Ministry of Transportation and Communication (legislative
organ), the Estonian National Maritime Board (implementing and controlling organ)
and the Port of Tallinn authority and different port operators like Pakterminal,
Eurodeck, Neste (liquid bulk operators) and Ferry Terminal as the main container
operator were visited. These appointments gave the author change to listen to both
legislation drafters’ and terminal operators’ opinions about legislative acts with aim
to understand the strengths and weaknesses of existing regulations. Due to Internet
databases it was possible to find out all of the complete texts of the European
Commission’s directives and Estonian legislation. The analyses of materials
published in the magazines “Cargo Systems”, “Port Development International”, and
the “Hazardous Cargo Bulletin” available in the WMU library helped to bring out
weaknesses and problems related to dangerous cargo.

1.3 Difficulties
The author must thanks all governmental and non- governmental officers,
especially in the Pakterminal and Neste terminal for cooperation and any kind of
help. The most difficult part during the research and writing process was to collect
relevant statistics concerning dangerous cargo movement in Estonia. The main
reason was that general statistics of dangerous cargo movement does not exist. The
information found was not updated and it was impossible to visit all related
companies and institutions during a few weeks. Another problem rised when the
author asked information about accidents and “near misses” in Estonian terminals.

3

Managers did not hide the fact that minor incidents have happened. Unfortunately
they decided to refuse to give more accurate information. During the research
process the author familiarized with literature which introduce port operations and
maritime transport. To his surprise, problems related to handling of dangerous cargo,
especially liquid harmful substances are not often analysed in maritime publications.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DANGER OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
AND THEIR POSSIBLE IMPACTS

Chemicals cause danger during their transport. Their damaging effect varies
considerably, depending on their classification. In this chapter the definition of
dangerous cargo is introduced. The author also describes different classes of
chemicals and analyses characteristics which make substances dangerous. Finally,
different impacts both to humans and the environment is analysed.

2.1 Definition of dangerous cargo
In the maritime literature and legislation expressions “dangerous cargoes and
goods”, “harmful substances”, and “hazardous materials” can be seen. The variety of
terminology causes confusion and rises the question: “What is the difference between
these words?” Captain Roos, the Harbour Master of the Bremenhaven gives good
explanation. According to him there are three areas which are related to dangerous
substances: production, transport and use. To make better distinctions between them,
in the transport chain dangerous substances should be called “Dangerous Cargoes”.
The IMO uses in its documents both the phrase “dangerous goods” (SOLAS, IMDG
Code) and “Dangerous cargoes” (“Recommendations on the Safe Transport of
Dangerous Cargoes and Related Activities in Port Areas”). The US authorities prefer
“hazardous materials”. Therefore, there is no exact phrase which is used everywhere
in the world and different words is used to describe same thing.
What are dangerous cargoes? Broadly, these are cargoes that endanger lives,
people, property and the marine environment (Rawson, 1994). IMO defines
dangerous cargoes in the “Recommendations on the Safe Transport of Dangerous
Cargoes and Related Activities in Port Areas” in the following way:
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Means any of the following cargoes, whether packaged, carried in bulk
packagings or in bulk within the scope of following regulations:
1. petroleum in any form including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and refined
products mentioned in annex I of MARPOL 73/78.
2. Noxious liquid substances falling into category A, B, C, D of MARPOL annex II.
3. Dangerous hazardous and harmful substances and materials including marine
pollutants and wastes covered by IMDG Code.
4. Solid bulk materials possessing chemical hazards and solid bulk materials
hazardous only in bulk covered by annex B of the BC Code.
The same document adds more.
The term “dangerous cargoes” includes any empty uncleaned packagings which
previously contained dangerous cargoes, unless the packagings have been
sufficiently cleaned….
Though, the definition is wide and almost every port in every country handle some of
these substances or items mentioned in Conventions.

2.2 The classification of dangerous chemicals
Today there are 100 million different kinds of chemicals in the world that can
be referred to as dangerous. It is estimated that not less than 100,000 of them are
commercially traded (Brünings, 1999). Every year 10-20 thousand new chemicals
are developed, around 2000 of them entering to commercial business. The transport
of dangerous substances by sea is especially dangerous as the amounts on board can
be big if to compare with land transport. In a chemical tanker it is possible for each
cargo tank to carry 20 to 2000 times the quantity of single road tanks (James, 1994).
Hazardous materials can cause serious harm to human health and the environment.
The damaging effect of chemicals varies considerably, mostly depends on their type,
toxic content, reactivity, condition of discharge concentration and amount. Some
hazards come from the substance itself but some are the result of contact between
two chemicals. The research to find out the hazards of certain chemicals and their
mixture has been a long- term process where different methods have been used.
According to K. Brünings (1999) the following ways are the most common:
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1. practical historical knowledge (showed the hazards of explosives)
2. long term experiences ( showed the hazards of asbestos)
3. accidents
4. laboratory tests
On the basis of the characteristics of substances, UN experts on the transportation of
dangerous goods prepared the book “Minimum Requirements for the Transportation
of Dangerous Goods “ in 1956, which divides chemicals into nine groups according
to their characteristics. These groups are the following:
1. explosives
2. gases
3. flammable liquids
4. flammable solids
5. oxidizing substances
6. poisonous substances
7. radioactive materials
8. corrosives
9. miscellaneous dangerous goods

2.2.1 Description of classes.
In this paragraph different groups of chemicals, which are most often
transported, are described.
Flammable substances
The terms “flammable” and “inflammable” are synonyms and refer to the ability of a
substance to burn. A naked flame is not the only possibility to cause the fire, a spark
from static electricity or the impact of something hard on an iron surface can be
sufficient. For instance, carbon disulphide can be ignited by the heat of a steam pipe
(Brice, 1990). Read more about flammable materials in paragraph 2.3.1.
Oxidising substances
These are substances which decompose to release oxygen and can assist fire. A
combination of flammable and oxidising materials is dangerous and can cause an
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explosion.

Chlorates, perchlorates and nitrates are good examples of oxidising

substances (Brice, 1990).
Radioactive substances
These substances emit ionising rays or particles. In high doses radiation burns
tissues, leading to radiation sickness. Lower doses can induce cancer of various
forms and leukaemia (Brice, 1990).
Corrosives
These substances eat their way through metals, plastic, other materials and tissues.
Strong acids are obvious examples. Strong alkalis are also corrosives but they do not
attack any metals except aluminium.
Poisonous substances
These substances can cause illness or death after one short exposure either by
swallowing, skin contact or inhalation. The effect of these substances can be
reversible or permanent. For example, the inhalation of some solvent vapours can
cause unconsciousness, which may wear off if the victim is moved to the clean air
zone. The absorption of a small amount of methanol, at the same time, can cause
permanent blindness.

2.3 Physical and chemical criteria which makes chemicals dangerous
Flammability is the main hazards faced by those handling dangerous cargo, it
is followed by corrosivity and toxicity. Flammable dangerous goods comprise a vast
range of products across the solid- liquid- gas spectrum from metal carbides and
organic peroxides to liquefied gases and oil products. It is important to be familiar
with the danger of flammability as the volume of this type of cargo is big. At the
same time corrosives, toxic and radioactive substances are transported in relatively
small quantities and under very controlled conditions. Although through Estonian
ports mainly flammable cargoes are transported, then mainly their chemical criteria
are under the view in the dissertation. In addition, many accidents with seafarers and
terminal workers happen when they are affected by a lack of oxygen. For that reason
one paragraph is dedicated to introduce dangers related to oxygen consumption
problem.
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2.3.1 Flammability
Fires, explosions and poisoning vapours are main source of threats which are met
during the handling of flammable substances. Flammable and explosives materials
do not burn by themselves. Specific physical and chemical conditions influence the
process. The source of ignition (spark or fire), fuel and oxygen must be present. If
one of these elements showed on the chart 1 misses, fire will not occur (Bond, 1991).
Source of ignition

Fuel

Oxygen

Chart 1. The fire triangle

The flashpoint and the suitable mixture of air and gas are main conditions for
combustion and explosions. A flashpoint of a flammable liquid is the lowest
temperature at which it gives off sufficient vapour to form an ignitable mixture near
the surface of the liquid (ISGOTT, 1996). Substances with low flashpoints are more
dangerous than the substance with high one. According to flashpoint it is possible to
group liquids chemicals into two categories entitled non- volatile and volatile.
Non-volatile liquids
Chemicals with flashpoints over + 61°C belong to the group. These liquids produce
in normal temperature vapour which flammable concentration is below the lower
limit. In other words, their gases cannot burn and the substance is not considered as
dangerous (Brünings, 1999). The category includes fuel oils, heavy gas oils and
diesel oils.
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Volatile liquids
Chemicals with flashpoints below +61° belong to the group. Liquids in this category
are capable to produce in normal temperature air/gas mixtures above upper
flammable limits. Examples in this category are jet fuel, kerosene, petrol and crude
oil. Volatile liquids are divided into three subgroups according to their danger:
1. Substances with low flashpoint below –18°C.
The most well known substance is petrol with a flashpoint between -27 °C and 50°C).
2. Intermediate substances have flashpoint between –18°C and +23°C.
3. High flashpoint liquids have a critical temperature up to +23°C to +61°C. Diesel
oil (+43°C to +88°C) belongs to that class.
As it was mentioned before the temperature of flammable vapours is not enough
to ignite a fire, the sufficient amount of oxygen must be also in present. The suitable
concentration of vapour and oxygen is called the ”flammable range” (ISGOTT, 1996).
Lower limit of that range means that there is an insufficient amount of
hydrocarbon gas in the air to support and propagate combustion (ISGOTT, 1996).
An upper flammable limit means that hydrocarbon gas in the air is above the
flammable limit and there is not enough oxygen to support the fire.
Flammable limits vary for different chemicals and physical conditions such as
pressure, temperature and mixture (Bond, 1991). In practice gas mixtures’ lower and
upper limits of oil cargoes are between 1% and 10% by volume of atmosphere
(ISGOTT, 1996).

Table 1. Flammable range of different type of oils.
Substance

Lower limit

Upper limit

Crude oil

2.2%

9.5%

Aviation gasoline

1.9%

8.5%

Natural gasoline

1.5%

7.8%

Source: ISGOTT 1996
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2.3.2 Vapours
Vapours are not dangerous only from the point of safety. Volatile organic
compounds (VOC) vapours, which originate from the manufacture, storage and
distribution of products like gasoline and solvents are also pollutants. They cause
environment contamination and danger to lives and vegetation. Volatile organic
compounds although react with sunlight and form photochemical smog, which
causes global warming. Even more, vapours containing individual toxic products like
benzene (UN no. 1114) are the key substances of causing cancer in human beings.
Volatility (the tendency of oil and its products to produce vapours) is
characterised by the vapour pressure, which depends on temperature, constituents
and the volume of the vapour space. The higher the pressure the bigger the
evaporation.
All liquids have a natural tendency to achieve equilibrium within surroundings.
For liquid stored in a tank this means that evaporation occurs until a certain
concentration of gas has been established in the vapour space. The equilibriumsaturated concentration depends on the vapour pressure of the liquid. The higher the
vapour’s pressure the bigger the evaporation. The emission of vapours to the
atmosphere during the handling of large quantities of oil is possible in three ways:
•

Displacement losses of vapour when filling the tanks

After filling a tank, a small proportion of the liquid will evaporate in attempting
to achieve certain equilibrium concentration of vapour in the tank vapour space.
The evaporation is smaller when the tank already contains any liquid because
then the vapour already exists in the tank.
•

Losses through tank vents during the storage

Air temperature influences the emission of vapours in tanks. When the
temperature rises during the daytime the vapour pressure increases and results in
the emission of vapours to the atmosphere. At night, the pressure decreases and
air is drawn into the tank. This creates a driving force for new evaporation until
the vapour equilibrium concentration is re-established. The amounts of losses of
vapours can be significant depending upon the liquid volatility and temperature
change.
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•

Losses from opening hatches on transport units

These amounts are not big but can still contribute losses. This happens when the
hatch is opened to enter or withdraw the loading arm or the hose.
The hazard of vapours depends on their density and toxicity. If the vapour
density is less than 1.0, the vapour rises high and disperses soon (ISGOTT,
1996). In case of density more than 1.0, hydrocarbons’ vapours spread near the
ground or deck and may travel down stairs (ISGOTT, 1996). These vapours do
not disperse quickly and may affect human lives very seriously. For instance, the
density of vapour of petrol is greater than the density of air. Therefore layering
effect must be taken into consideration in handling this type of cargo.

Table 2. Different densities of oil and its products relative to air
DENSITY

DENSITY

SUBSTANCE

Pure hydrocarbon

50 % by hydrocarbon / 50% air

Crude oil

1.55

1.25

Aviation gasoline

2.0

1.5

Natural gasoline

2.5

1.8

Source: ISGOTT 1996

The toxic hazard of chemicals depend on various kinds of hydrocarbon
constituents of vapour. Toxicity can be influenced by the presence of aromatic
hydrocarbons (benzene, toluene, xylene) and hydrogen sulphide (ISGOTT, 1996).
For instance, already small quantities of petroleum vapour cause symptoms similar to
drunkness with headache and irritation of eyes. In high concentrations it leads to
paralyses, insensibility and death. The smell of petroleum vapour is variable and
sometimes it can be even without smell. This happens when the vapour contains
hydrogen sulphide. Therefore the absence of smell cannot be an indicator of the
absence of vapours.

12

2.3.3 Oxygen consumption
The oxygen content in enclosed spaces (like holds or tanks) may be low
because it is removed by chemical reactions. This causes a danger to human life.
There are special symptoms which indicate a lack of oxygen but most people cannot
recognise them until they are too weak to escape without help. The danger is
extremely big when escape needs climbing out of the cargo holes or tank. If the
amount of available oxygen decreases below 21% of the volume of atmosphere
breathing becomes faster and deeper (ISGOTT, 1996). An atmosphere containing
less than 10% oxygen content by volume causes unconsciousness and leads to death
of person unless the victim is removed quickly to the open air (ISGOTT, 1996).
Oxygen level falling under 5% by volume of atmosphere causes immediate
unconsciousness and brain damage even if life is restored later (ISGOTT, 1996).
2.4 Possible impacts of dangerous chemicals
The wrong handling of dangerous chemical substances may cause accidents
which impacts may be very serious. They can pollute water, kill living people and
organisms, destroy property and affect the economy. In the following part of the text
potential consequences are under view.

2.4.1 Pollution of water and mortality of fauna and flora.
Chemicals discharged into the water can affect the aquatic ecosystem in many
ways (Pardo, 1999).
•

Impact on the exchange of gases spilled into the water start biological processes
which consume the oxygen in the water.

•

Energy release cause water temperature increase

•

Toxic properties on the surface and in the water affect negatively marine life.
Chemical pollution can be a direct or a long term. When the direct impact

affects the environment immediately, then the long-term influences the flora and
fauna even after the disappearing of the pollution. The reason is that some chemicals
can enter into the organic food cycle and affect fish’ and mammals’ fecundity and
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growth, physical disturb feeding or cause tainting and accumulation of substances
into the organisms.

2.4.2 Destruction of property
Explosions and fires of hazardous chemicals are the main reasons of the
damage of vessel and port structure. Especially dangerous are substances belonging
to UN classes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
To show the impact of an explosion, the “Fort Strikene” example is described.
The cargo vessel “Fort Strikene” was moored alongside Victoria dock in Bombay in
1944. There were 1,260 tonnes of dynamite and 1,648 tonnes of bales of cotton
loaded in the same hold. The cotton ignited itself and caused dynamite explosion.
The “Fort Strikene” exploded with such a force that nine ships sank and the port was
completely destroyed. More worse, extremely high waves killed 1,376 people and
damaged hundreds of houses (Compton, 1999).
The incident shows that when large quantities of explosives or flammable chemicals
are transported extreme safety measures must be taken into consideration.

2.4.3 Death and serious injuries to human life
Explosions, fires and toxic vapours of different chemicals are the main
dangers affecting people. As the results of explosions and fires have been already
described in part 2.3.2 then now the main concentration is dedicated to the impact of
vapours.
To show the seriousness of vapour release, the Bhopal gas cloud disaster is
described.
The pesticide factory situated in Bhopal, a city with a population of 670,000 in
central India. On the 3 of December in 1984, 15 tonnes of the highly toxic and
irritant gas methyl isocyonate (UN no 2480) leaked from the tank. The gas cloud
covered a 30- mile long and 1.5- mile wide area. It was estimated that 200,000
people breathed the vapour, 2,500 of whom died due to the flooding of their lungs.
125,000 people required hospital treatment, of whom 20,000 were seriously sick.
(HCB, 1985).
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2.4.4 Negative impact to the economy of the area where the accident occurred
Pollution’s negative affect the economy basis on its high cost which is can be
divided into two groups. When direct costs are related to the recovery of physical
damage, reconstruction work, and also clean up operations them indirect costs can be
associated with the closure of affected areas for navigation, sea use and customers
trust (tourists number decreases, fish products are boycotted by consumers).
Although international funds (today the International Oil Pollution Fund, which
covers crude oil pollution and in the future the HNS Fund, which covers pollution of
hazardous substances) cover expenses, there are very often occasions when their
financing is not sufficient or the pollution claims are not accepted by the fund. In this
case the money must be taken from the government budget which causes poor
financing of some other area.
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CHAPTER 3
THE OVERVIEW OF THE TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS
CARGOES IN THE DIFFERENT PART OF THE WORLD
As the world becomes more industrialised the list of chemicals developed and
produced increases year to year. Because of the main principle of logistics and the
role of multimodal transport more and more dangerous cargo is transported from one
area to another. According to the IMO materials, at the end of the 20th century more
than 50% of bulk and 10-15% of conteinerized or packed cargoes transported by sea
all over the world are classified as dangerous. The main objective of the chapter is to
emphasize the importance of the transportation of dangerous cargo in the world. The
author introduces main countries and ports which have leading role in handling of
dangerous cargo in the world. More detailed overview of transportation of dangerous
cargo in the Baltic Sea is given. Finally, overview of development of movement of
harmful substances through Estonian ports in recent years is given.
3.1 World statistics
The main States of handling bulk and containerised dangerous cargo in the
world are the United States, Japan, Germany and United Kingdom. Although large
quantities of substances are transported mainly on land, sea transport has not lost its
importance, especially as a main carrier of liquid dangerous substances. In 1997 the
volume of the world seaborne trade of crude oil was 1,477.8 million tonnes (35% of
world seaborne trade), oil products 422.2 million tonnes (10% of world seaborne
trade) and chemicals 100.3 million tonnes (2.4 % of world seaborne trade)
(Intertanko, Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1999).

16

Chart 2. The division of world seaborne trade in 1997
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Source: Intertanko, Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1999

According to the Drewry Shipping Consultants, the US is the biggest importer of
Latin-American and northern European oil. The state imports from the Middle-East,
Africa, Asia and Mediterranean areas are stagnant. Japan’s crude oil is mainly
supplied by the Middle-East. Europe uses mainly local oil. On the basis of the
research of the Drewry Shipping Consultants, a similar trend is in oil products
seaborne trade. The USA is the main consumer of Latin-American and northern
European petrol. Europe itself is concentrated to use its own interregional sources
and decreases import from non- European states.
The United States
The United States is the biggest handler of dangerous substances. Inside the
state 4 billion tonnes of hazardous cargo are transported annually, involving 500,000
movements per day, mainly by road and rail (Compton, 1994). The state imported
425.8 million tonnes of crude oil and 87.6 million tonnes of oil products in 1998. At
the same time 8 million tonnes of crude oil and 15.7 millions tonnes of oil products
moved out of the country (BP Amoco Statistical Review of World Energy, 1999).
The main ports handling dangerous liquid substances are Philadelphia, Houston and
Tampa (table 1). The United States is also the leader in the trading of containerised
dangerous cargo. The biggest international trade of hazardous substances in the
world is between the USA and northern Europe. It is estimated that 10% of imported
containers to the US and 17% of exported from the US carry dangerous substances
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(Lyons, 1999). Between January and July 1999, 7,200,000 TEU-s containing
dangerous goods were moved between western coast of the US and Europe (Lyons,
1999). Eastbound coast trade was 600,000 TEU-s (Lyons, 1999). The biggest ports,
which handle conteinerized harmful substances in the USA are Long Beach, Los
Angeles and New York .
Table 3. Main oil ports in the US and their throughput in 1998
Port

Oil throughput

Philadelphia

41million tonnes

Houston

40 million tonnes

Tampa

13 million tonnes

Seattle

13 million tonnes

Los Angeles

3 million tonnes

Source: Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics

Canada
In Canada, 230 million tonnes of packed dangerous goods are transported per
year, involving 75,000 movements per day, mainly by road. Statistics show that 56%
of Canada’s total cargo is moved by trucks.
Table 4. Approximate annual numbers of dangerous cargo movements in Canada
Mode

Shipments

Quantity (tonnes)

Marine

10,000

71,300,000

Rail

510,000

29,900,000

Road

24,990,000

128,708,000

Air

1,490,000

92,000

Source: Transport Canada

The biggest oil port in Canada is Saint John N.B., with a throughput of 15 million
tonnes of oil and its products in 1997. It was followed by Quebec (8.7 million
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tonnes) and Halifax (4.2 million tonnes) (Institute of Shipping Economics and
Logistics, 1998).
Asia
The Asian biggest oil port is Kaohsiung in Taiwan. In 1997, operators handled 36.5
million tonnes of oil and its products. The Japanese ports of Yokohama and Nagoya,
with a throughput of 15.3 million and 14.4 million tonnes of oil keep second and
third place in Asia (Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics, 1998).
Europe
According to Mr. Endlicher, Head of Central Logistics of Bayer AG (1997), inside
Europe 88% of the movement of chemicals are done by road and 7% by rail. In 1990,
1.3 billion tonnes of hazardous substances were moved by road and 90 million
tonnes by train inside EU countries. Inside Germany several hundreds millions of
tonnes of chemicals are moved. Another 50 million tonnes are carried out of the
country by land (Lambrecht, 1992).
255 million tonnes of liquid dangerous cargoes, from which 10.3 million
tonnes were chemicals moved through UK ports in 1991 (James, 1992). Research
based two years early statistics showed that 3.6 million tonnes of packed hazardous
cargoes were handled by British terminals.
Rotterdam is the main European port for the transport of dangerous cargoes.
It is followed by Marseille (France), Milford Haven and Forth Port (UK) and
Willhelmshaven (Germany) (table 5).
On the basis of the statistics published in the homepage of the Port of
Rotterdam (2000), in 1998, a totally of 101 million tonnes of crude oil were handled
in Rotterdam. In addition, Rotterdam handles more than a half of the total amount of
oil products and chemicals in the North- Western part of Europe. In 1998, 20 million
tonnes of oil products and chemicals were transhipped through the port. Chemicals
are brought mainly from Germany, the USA, the UK, and countries in the Middle
East such as Saudi Arabia.
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Table 5. Biggest oil ports in Europe and their throughput in 1998
Port

Oil and its product throughput

Rotterdam (The Netherlands)

120 million tonnes

Marseille (France)

45 million tonnes

Wilhelmshaven (Germany)

36 million tonnes

Forth Ports (UK)

33 million tonnes

Milford Haven (UK)

33 million tonnes

Le Havre (France)

28.8 million tonnes

Ventspils (Latvia)

25 million tonnes

London (UK)

18 million tonnes

Genoa (Italy)

17 million tonnes

Source: Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics

3.2 Baltic Sea statistics
Approximately 143,000 tonnes of packaged dangerous cargo is carried in
4000 shipments in the Baltic Sea every month. A totally of 795 different substances
are transported, half of them are carried only once or twice a month and only a
hundred of different substances are carried more than 20 times. Summary of the
substances is in annex 1.
The main dangerous goods transported in packed form in the Baltic Sea are
inflammable gases (class 3 according to IMDG Code), followed by corrosives (class
8) and oxidizing substances (class 5).
130 shipping routes carrying dangerous goods in the Baltic Sea. Only in 80 of
them monthly quantities are bigger than 100 tonnes. (List of these routes is shown in
annex 2). The length of the shipping routes varies from a large number of short
distance shipments to 48 hour long shipments from the North-sea inlets to the ports
of southern Finland and eastern- Sweden. It is estimated that 35 ships with dangerous
goods on board are continuously at sea. The highest traffic density is in the southern
part of the Baltic Sea, near the Kiel Canal approach and its surrounding waters. A
medium traffic density is found in Danish waters, the Kattegat, along the Swedish
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east coast and in the Gulf of Finland. Transport activity is quite low in the Gulf of
Bothnia.
Table 6. Total quantity and number of parcels per class transported in the Baltic Sea

Class and property
1 Explosives

Quantity, tonnes

Number of parcels

2,700

370

2

Gases

10,900

1,100

3

Inflamable liquids

32,450

4,700

4

Inflammable solids

18,500

540

5 Oxidizing substances

25,000

510

6

Poisonous substances

12,800

1,100

7

Radioactive materials

1,300

30

8

Corrosives

29,600

2,400

9

Others

9,500

640

Total

142,750

11,390

Source: Helsinki Commission

The ferry lines’ part in transportation of dangerous cargo is significant.
76,000 tonnes which make 53% of the total amount of the dangerous cargo, are
shipped with ferries sailing in 34 different routes. (List of these routes is shown in
annex 3).
Approximately 52 million tonnes of oil and its products, 5.8 million tonnes of
liquid chemicals and 2.9 million tonnes of gases were carried in 1999 in the Baltic
Sea. It is estimated that 12 loaded chemical tankers and 3-4 loaded gas carriers
continuously sail at sea. The main ports handling oil and its products in the Baltic
Sea are Ventspils in Latvia and Tallinn in Estonia.
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Chart 3. Biggest oil ports in the Baltic Sea
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3.3 Estonian statistics
As any research covering dangerous cargo movement in all Estonian ports
around the country have not been done and the official annual statistics do not exist,
it is difficult to find out accurate figures. The only official survey available were
done in 1995 by the Helsinki Port Authority in Finland (covered transport of
dangerous cargo by ferries between Tallinn and Helsinki) and in 1997 by Estonian
Maritime Board’s Hazardous Cargo Division (covered dangerous cargo movement
through Estonian three main ports during 10 days). To get more updated information
the statistics of handled cargo by main stevedore companies is used.
The direction of traffic flow of dangerous goods in Estonian ports depends
very much of the type of the cargo. Bulk cargo moves usually through ports out of
the country. According to the port statistics, ammonium nitrate (UN no. 1942 and
2067), which can be qualified as dry bulk, moves 100 % from Russian factories to
Estonian ports by rail with aim to export to the world market by ships.
Similar situation is in the liquid bulk trade. Approximately 95% of oil products move
from Russia to Estonian ports by railway and later shipped to the world. The
remaining 5 % (mainly gasoline) is transported to Estonian ports from the Neste
refinery in Finland by ships and is consumed in the country or sent out to the other
Baltic States or Russia.
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Opposite to the liquid and dry bulk cargo movement trend, 90% of
containerised dangerous cargo is imported to Estonia by ships and moved later to
Russia by rail or Latvia and Lithuania by road.
A similar trend is in ferry transport. Most of the trucks and trailers carrying
hazardous substances come from Finland and Sweden. Some of them continue their
trip to other Baltic States.
Dangerous cargo usually moves through the ports, which are in Tallinn.
Most oil products, containers, dry bulk and some trailers are shipped through the
biggest Estonian port known as the “Port of Muuga”. Some containers and most of
the trailers move through the Old Harbour. Only trucks using ferry route between
Paldiski (Estonia)- Kappelskär (Sweden) travel through the Port of Paldiski, which is
in the NW part of the country.
The quantities of packed dangerous cargo transported through Estonian ports
are not significant. Research done by the Estonian Maritime Board in 1997 showed
that during 10 days 811 tonnes of packed dangerous goods were imported through
the three ports (table 5).
Table 7. Main chemicals in packed form imported to Estonia
Substance

UN no

IMDG class

Ethanol

1170

3.1

Acetone

1090

3.2

Aerosol disperses

1950

2

Chromic acid

1463

5.1

Paints

1263

3.1

Source: Estonian Maritime Administration

At the same time only 63 tonnes of packed dangerous goods were exported. The
main substances are marked in the table 8.
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Table 8. Main chemicals exported from Estonia
Substance

UN no

IMDG class

Quantity

Chromic acid

1463

5.1

42.0 tonnes

Chlorine

1017

2

2.5 tonnes

Dichlorosodifluoro
methane

1028

2

17.0 tonnes

Source: Estonian Maritime Administration

According to 10 days statistics it is possible to estimate that approximately 30,000
tonnes of packaged dangerous cargo moved through Estonian ports in 1997 (Hurbas,
1997). Although this limited time period may be too short for producing statistically
reliable data, it is still useful information, previously not available at all. As the cargo
amount has increased between 1997 and 2000, so the number is probably bigger
now.
Another research related to truck movements between Estonia and Finland
was done in 1995 by Helsinki Port Authority. During the period between 1 January
and 30 June, 5,562 tonnes of dangerous cargo in 864 trailers sailed across the Gulf of
Finland (Arro, 1996). 4481 tonnes (81% of the total quantity) were liquid chemicals
like paints, 461 tonnes (8.3%) of corrosives (class 8) and 233 tonnes (4.2%) of gases
(class 2). The research showed that 140 trucks with dangerous cargo moved monthly
between Tallinn and Helsinki in 1995. According to the statistics published in the
magazine “Cruise & Ferry Info” approximately 5,500 lorries were transported per
month between these two towns in 1995. A simple calculation shows that 140 lorries
from 5,500 are 2.6%. If to use the same ratio in 1999 when 7,800 tracks sailed
between Tallinn and Helsinki per month, then 2.6% is 203 lorries.
If the containerised or packed dangerous cargo quantities transported through
Estonia is not significant and sudden rise can not been seen, then the importance of
transportation of oil related substances increase year to year. Estonia has risen to the
second biggest oil transhipment country after Latvia (25 million tonnes in 1999) in
the Baltic Sea region. (Look chart 3). According to Mr. R. Vare (2000), the Director-
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General of the Pakterminal, the main advantage why Russian oil exporters prefer
Estonian ports to others at the same region is the vicinity to the Russian border.
When the “Port of Muuga” situates 210 km from the border then the main
competitors Klaipeda in Lithuania and Ventspils in Latvia stays 400 km from Russia.
In addition, the Klaipeda port’s oil transit route goes through Belorussia, which
automatically adds two extra border crossings and significantly decreases their
competitive position in the market.
In 1999, 17.1 million tonnes of oil and its products were handled in four
Estonian ports. The biggest throughput (14.5 million tonnes) was in the “Port of
Muuga”, followed by the “Port of Vene- Balti” (1.8 million tonnes) and the “Port of
Miiduranna” (0.8 million tonnes).
Chart 4. Historical overview of liquid bulk cargo transport development in the ports
of “Port of Tallinn”
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Port of Muuga
In 1999, 611 tankers with a total dwt 5,000,000 visited the port. They loaded
13,317,400 tonnes and discharged 611,400 tonnes of oil and its products (source).
14.5 million tonnes of oil handled in the “Port of Muuga” put the harbour on the list
of the biggest European oil ports into the 10th position (Institute of Shipping
Economics and Logistics, 1998).
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Chart 5. Different oil terminals and their throughput in the “Port of Tallinn”
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To emphasise the importance and activities related to oil transportation in
Estonia the main oil terminal is introduced. Pakterminal a 50%- 50 % joint venture of
Estonian investors and Netherlands’s Ovpak company is the largest of seven existing
oil terminals in Estonia. It is also the biggest in the Baltic States. When in 1995 its
throughput was 2.24 million tonnes of oil, then in 1999 the number was already 8.04
million (47% of total 1999 year Estonian oil transhipment).
Chart 6. Throughput of oil in the Pakterminal in million tonnes
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The number of discharged railway tanks in the terminal increase year by year.
In 1997 the terminal handled 86,000 and in 1998 already 129,000 railway tanks. In
the year of 1999 the number reached to 139,000. The total storage capacity of the
terminal is 206,000 m3. Three rail tanks discharge installations can handle 84 wagons
simultaneously. The traffic in the terminal is very active, statistics show that 400 rail
tanks carrying 20,000-23,000 tonnes of fuel, are discharged per day, and at least one
tanker is moored to load oil in the quay every day. 95% of the cargo comes from
Russia and is transhipped by tankers to the world market. 5% of cargo comes by sea
and is sent mainly to Russia by rail tanks.
Chart 7. Number of railway tanks handled in the Pakterminal
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The rough division of operating cargo in the terminal is the following:
•

40% of cargo is classified as heavy oil

•

40% gasoline (UN no.1203, IMDG class 5.1)

•

20% kerosene (UN no.1223, IMDG class 3.3)
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CHAPTER 4
THE ROLE OF STATISTICS IN THE TRANSPORTATION
OF DANGEROUS CARGOES
The detail survey about the movement of dangerous cargo may look
unimportant to persons who are not involved in handling of harmful substances. In
reality the accurate statistics play a significant role in many fields. In the chapter
different possibilities how to use the statistics have been analysed.
4.1 The importance of the statistics
Statistics plays an important role in modern industry. It is useful both operator
companies and legislative bodies. The developments of companies, service supply
level and amount of production, also safety and precaution measures depends on the
analysis of statistics. Similar principles are in the business of dangerous goods
transportation. Collecting, updating and analysing statistics related to the movement
and handling of harmful substances is the key issue which helps to:
•

establish state transport policy and local legislation.

On the basis of statistics authorities must analyse all pro- and con-arguments of
the transportation of dangerous cargoes. All of the advantages (encourage state’s
economy) and disadvantages (danger to people and the environment) must be
taken into consideration. For instance, in the UK and Germany the government
encourages coastal shipping instead of using land transport to move dangerous
cargo. Germany has established regulations that, since 1991, containers with
highly flammable goods transported farer than 200 km from starting point must
be shipped by railway or waterway. Inflammable liquids with flashpoints of less
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than 21°C must be treated in a similar way when they are shipped more than 100
km. All dangerous goods transported more than 400 km have to be moved by
combined transport. This is of course in case when ports and railway nets exist.
The main reason to establish that regulation is the tank container explosion in the
centre of the city of Herborn in 1988. Baltic States, opposite, are interested in
cargo movement from Western Europe to Finland using “Via Baltic” road
through their countries.
•

define main traffic routes and increase safety

Statistics are the basis for develop contingency plan (Sampson, 2000). The
authorities have an overview of the amount of dangerous cargo transported through
the area. This information gives responsible authorities chance to define possible
dangers and impacts and to take measures to avoid accidents or decrease their
impacts (local response service officers are trained to deal with possible hazards and
specific response equipment is stored in the area).
•

restrict dangerous cargo movements in sensitive areas

In case statistics show that large quantities or extremely dangerous substances go
through the highly populated or environmentally sensitive areas, local authorities can
close some areas for transport. For instance, in Finland it is prohibited to transport
chemicals except class 2 in some build up areas. In Norway it is prohibited to
transport dangerous substances belonging to UN classes 1, 2 and 3 through long
underground tunnels (HCB, 1998).
•

make marketing research and develop economy

The development of economy basis on marketing research. When the environment is
suitable and attractive for business, investments will be done. It can be economically
beneficial to establish a container-cleaning yard to an area where tank containers are
loaded or discharged.
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4.2 “A crisis management map”
“A crisis management map” is not a new invention, which is used already
many years in France. Despite of that fact it needs introducing as in many countries
the idea is new.
The mapping of transport routes is the easiest way to find out possible dangerous
areas on the chemical cargo transport route. The map must also show the places to
get some help in case of emergency. In addition, it can help to educate people in how
to act in the case of an accident.
“The crisis management map” is developed on the basis of dangerous
transportation statistics. It illustrates the major dangerous goods’ transport routes
(including rail, road and sea) and pipelines for gas, oil and chemicals in the region.
Ports handling oil products and other chemicals should be marked on the map. It is
also important to define the position of oil refineries, chemical or petrochemical
complexes and nuclear power plants which are designated “liable to be affected by a
major accident” as defined by the European Council directive 96/82 “Seveso II”. In
Estonia, twenty-one enterprises fall under the directive’s criteria. The list of these
enterprises is in annex 4. In case of accident to get a quick response, the location of
rescue services and hospitals should also be marked. To make the map more useful,
additional information (placards, UN numeration) of how to understand road tankers
identification plates, should be printed on it. The most effective scale of the map is
1:200 000 (“Mapping dangerous goods”, 1993). The map should be available to
everybody who is directly related to transportation and rescue or response operations
(police stations, rescue and fire fighting centres, local authorities) or whose work is
related to driving around the area and who can be eye- witnesses to accidents (post
and transport companies). For instance, a postman is out on his rounds and he is an
eyewitness of road tank fire. The driver is immobilised and the tank load is spilling
out. A local farmer is trying to extinguish the burning load with water. By simply
viewing the tanker’s information plate and the consulting map, the postman
understands that the farmer’s good intentions are not appropriate and increase the
risk to aggravating the situation (Gagnier, 1993). France has a more ambitious plan.
Their aim is to introduce to their country every citizens possible hazards and teach
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them to act in the critical situation. More than 4000 maps are distributed to local
schools and companies. Mr. Daniel Gagnier from the Ministry of the Environment’s
industrial risk prevention directorate explained it as a way to increase non-experts’
knowledge to act or not to act in case of accident. There is a need to educate people
as surveys showed that general awareness of hazardous substances is zero, the
understanding of placards are poor and sometimes lead to wrong conclusions
(Maynard, 1986). About survey read in the annex 5 People must know about dangers
they can meet. “A crisis management map” gives good change to study the dangers.
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CHAPTER 5
ACCIDENTS AND THEIR AVOIDANCE
Transport and handling of dangerous substances are activities with the high risk.
In this chapter historical overview of biggest accidents is given. The chapter also points
out most common violations in container transportation. Finally, establishment of
management system, use of safe technology and continuous training of workers as main
areas to avoid accidents happen are analyzed.
5.1 Accidents with dangerous substances, statistics of 1999
Disasters have followed the transport and storage of dangerous cargo through
history. The earliest registered gunpowder explosion happened in Boston in 1645. The
accident killed three people and destroyed half of the city (Marshall, 1987). The first
explosion involving a new generation of explosives took place in Heleneburg, Sweden in
1864. An interesting fact is that the accident killed five persons including Emil Nobel,
brother of the inventor of dynamite (Marshall, 1987). The earliest chemical fire was
recorded in 1759. It was the result of spillage of bottle of nitric acid (Marshall, 1987).
The first ammonium nitrate explosion happened in Kingston, London in 1896 (Marshall,
1987). It is recorded that the intentional release of toxic gas was used already in 429 BC
during the siege of Plata and in 1915 during the attack at Ypres which killed 5000
soldiers. The first non-military release of chlorine was recorded in the State of Michigan,
USA in 1917 (Marshall, 1987).
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Ships loaded with dangerous cargo have been involved with many serious accidents.
Here are some remarkable examples.
1917 -Halifax harbor.
An overloaded ship, “Mont Blanc”, lost maneuverability and collided with other vessel.
2,600 tons of dynamite on board exploded. 3000 people died, 6000 were injured and
6,000 buildings were destroyed. The accident is defined as the biggest man- made
explosion until the advent of the atomic bomb.
1947 -Brest harbor
21 people lost their lives when the ammonium nitrate on board of the cargo ship “Ocean
Liberty” exploded.
1987 – the north- west coast of Spain
The cargo vessel “Cason” grounded. Seawater entered into holds and caused a strong
reaction with sodium. The result was the explosion of the cargo. 23 crewmembers died
and 20,000 residents of the nearest town were evacuated.
1999 – the south- east coast of UK
The violation of traffic rules caused the collision of the cruise ship “Norwegian Dream”
and the containership “Ever Decent”. Containers with dangerous substances started to
burn and evaporate toxic fumes. Moreover, some of them fell on the board of the cruise
ship and some into the sea. The accident had the potential to turn into a major pollution
incident with very bad consequence for the UK’s coastline but due to the quick work of
the response team the catastrophe was avoided (Garner, 1999).
Despite the enormous development of safety measures and the increase of cargo
handlers’ knowledge during the second part of the 20th century accidents still continue
to happen. Most accidents with dangerous substances happen in port areas during the
loading and discharging of liquid substances. According to the statistics published in the
magazine “Hazardous Cargo Bulletin”, there were 31 incidents related to the dangerous
cargo handling in 1999. 24 of them happened in ports and 7 at sea. 27 incidents were
related with tankers, other 4 with containerships. 17 accidents were explosions and
fires, mainly caused because of the emission of vapours. 12 spills happened in the port
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during discharge and loading operations. 20 people lost their lives and 45 were injured.
The list of all accidents happened in 1999 is available in annex 6.
5.2 Violation of regulations
When states have ratified and implemented legislation concerning dangerous
goods, responsible persons from port authorities and maritime administration must
concentrate to controlling the enforcement of existing rules. There is a need to do so
because surveys show that occasions of the violation of regulations are not rare. Very
often risks and dangers associated with transport and handling through ports are ignored.
Surveys show that typical violations are related to transport of harmful substances inside
containers. During the survey done in 12 ports in Belgium, the Netherlands and
Germany in 1989 from 2,437 inspected freight containers 1,384 were deficient, and 497
were barred from carriage. Situation was not better with tank containers because from
473 tank containers 193 were deficient and transport of 89 units were prohibited.
Although 41 trailers were inspected from which in 31 items were found some
deficiencies.
Violation of container packing rules is also common in other countries. Analyses
done in the southern part of the UK showed that the violation rate has reached 81%. The
main violations are usually related to stowage/segregation, labelling and documentation.
According to M. Compton, a survey done in the USA showed that 46% of violations are
related with stowage and segregation, 24% with documentation and 21% with placards.
Stowage and segregation
It is quite difficult to keep control over containers and the cargo inside it because the
owner of the container is a transport company, the packing is done by the freight
forwarder and stowage by the port operator. Usually the next link in the chain cannot be
sure that the previous did its job properly, and often it did not. Cargo carried in cargo
transport units must be packed and secured in the way to prevent damage or hazards to
ships, persons on board and the marine environment. Most of these types of violations
are caused by a lack of knowledge or by negligence. Workers who pack containers are
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not familiar of stresses affecting containers during transportation, especially at sea in
rough weather. Very often the planning of stowage is not done correctly, things are not
put tightly or the centre of gravity is in the wrong place. Violation of these rules causes
movement of the cargo and breakage of packages and even in some cases the lost of
containers overboard. The ferry “Nordic Pride” incident is one example from the long
list.
In rough weather conditions the vessel “Nordic Pride” on the route ZeebruggeeImmingham lost four tank containers loaded with triethylene tetranine (UN no 2259,
class 8: corrosives) and ethyl acylate (UN no 1912, marine pollutant) overboard. The
investigation found out that the main reason was a too- high centre of gravity of the
transport unit (Champion, 1991).
Documentation and labelling
Correct documentation and labeling plays an important role in the transport of
dangerous goods. All who are involved in the transport chain must know what they are
dealing with. In case of emergency, documentation helps the crew and the response team
to deal with the cargo, otherwise people’s lives can be endanger and the wrong
emergency response technology is used. To emphasize the importance of documentation
the vessel “Santa Clara I” incident’s one aspect is described. After the storm which
damaged several packages and drums on board of vessel, workers of the shipyard were
sent to clean the hold. After entering the hold 32 workers got poisoning and were sent to
the hospital. The problem was that magnesium phosphate (UN no 2011) was not
included into the cargo manifest and the hazard of air poisoning in the hold was not
appreciated. Problems with documentation and placards normally fall within one of the
following areas: unsigned or missing documents; incompetent or incorrect information
in documents, wrong size, missing or wrong information giving placards.
5.3 Safe running of enterprises with major hazards
According to the magazine “Hazardous Cargo Bulletin”, there were 31 accidents
with dangerous cargo in the maritime industry in 1999. But this is not all, it is estimated
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that for every actual accident involving a ship, there are around 10 “near misses”- events
which could have resulted in an accident (Norwegian Shipowner Association, 1995).
The simple calculation shows that in this case of 31 accidents there were 300 possible
accidents in 1999. Moreover, there is an enormous number of violation of rules or socalled non-conformities, which could cause “near- misses” or accidents (Norwegian
Shipowners Association, 1995). Accidents and nearly misses do not just happen. There
is always any cause. Different sources declare that 80-90% of accidents are caused by
human failure, but human errors are avoidable through the improvement of management
systems, the use of environmental friendly technology and the training of employees. Of
course, where dangerous goods are handled the risk of incidents can never be eliminated.
However, by using good, well-planned operating procedures the risk can be minimised.
5.3.1 Identification of hazards
In general, safety management is defined as a set of management activities that
ensure that hazards are effectively identified, understood and minimized. The OECD
(1992) recognises 21 management tasks and factors in the prevention of chemical
incidents. Among them the most important are hazard identification (what can happen),
hazard analyses (why it can happen), consequent assessment (what are the results and
how much they cost) and assessment of information and lessons learnt from relevant
major accidents.
Risk assessment process will be much more simple and many incidents will be
avoided when maritime industry implements similar system as air industry already has.
This is called a Safety and Improvement Reporting (SAFIR) system. The idea is very
simple. Shipping and stevedore companies should keep a record of accidents and
violations involving their ships and equipment. All incidents should be classified
according to their description like spill, fire, explosion or poisoning. Although the
impact and actual cost and time lost should be added. When during the particular time
period occurrence of one type of accidents is large, all cases must be carefully analysed
to identify the reasons of accidents and find out solutions of avoiding them in the future.
On the basis of the results, changes in working conditions must be done. These can be a
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critical review of existing management system, the improvement of technical equipment
or the extra training of employees.
Even the idea of creating an accident database seems quite simple, in real life it is quite
difficult to implement it. It is relatively easy to identify accidents, but “near-misses” and
non- conformities cause more problems. Employees are not interested in reporting their
errors as they scare to show themselves in a bad light and lose their jobs. To avoid this
kind of threats, companies must establish official policies to encourage to report of
errors and not to punish the workers. Employees at the same time should trust
management. Only the wide co-operation of both sides helps to achieve the real aim; the
safe and environmentally friendly handling of dangerous goods.
5.3.2 Safe and environmental friendly management
During the last ten years the importance of environmental matters has increased
significantly. A large number of resolutions, recommendations, standards and codes
related to environment protection have been drafted. But this is only the beginning. As
Mr. P. Barnevik, president and chief executive of ABB said: “If you think today’s
environmental requirements seem like a breeze, you should get ready for the storm
tomorrow.” It means, companies have to establish new goals for environmentally
friendly activities, otherwise in the near future they are enforced to leave the market.
Most accidents in the oil and dangerous cargo industry cause environmental
damages. To avoid them, an integrated management system, which includes both safety
and environmental management, should be used. Integrated management is a new way
of thinking where safety and pollution prevention are not negotiable topics. In other
words, profit cannot be earned on the base of pollution and the lack of safety. As the
dangerous substance industry is a wide area covering handling and transporting both on
shore and at sea, different standards have been worked out. For ports it means obtaining
the ISO 14,000 and for ships the ISM. Even both standards have different titles the main
idea is the same- improvement of organisations efficiency and internal control,
minimisation of the risk of system and human error.
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ISO 14,000 is a voluntary document about management system which monitors an
operation’s impact on the environment. The main goals of the system are related to
pollution prevention and a decrease in the risk of potential accidents. For ports it means
mainly the existence of environmental friendly loading technology and oily waste
reception facilities. In 1995, 38,000 organisations planned to become registered to ISO
14000 (Horck, 1999). Environmental friendly management plays especially important
role in the Baltic Sea area because of the unique status of the sea. The ISM Code is a
mandatory document established by IMO for ship companies. It is compulsory to all
tankers and gas carriers of 500 gt and upward. The Code establishes a system for the
safe and environmental friendly management and operation of vessels with the aim to
support and encourage a safety culture in shipping. The result is that the Code forces
substandard shipowners to remove out of business and the marine environment is better
protected. Even the analyse of the code is not the aim of the dissertation the author wants
to emphasise the importance of one paragraph of the Code.
Chapter 5.2 says the following:
“the master has an overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions with
respect to safety and pollution prevention.”
This point is very important. The author of the dissertation has been witness of the
situation where a master of a tanker refused to enter the port because of the bad weather.
Despite the possible danger of accident the terminal management used all kinds of
pressure including influencing the shipowner to force the ship berthing. The operator
company needed the ship to load the cargo quickly into it and get free space as terminal
tanks were full but new trains arrived continuously. In a good shipping company which
has implemented a safety management system this kind of pressure is useless and does
not give any effect.
5.3.3 Technical equipment
Technical equipment in terminals plays an important role in safety matters. Accident
shows that equipment used in terminals is not necessarily the best one in the market
(Horck, 1999). Accidents are mainly related to hoses and their connections, over
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pressure inside pipeline systems and static electricity. At the same time external factors
like faulty design and corrosion of pipelines’ structures can also cause accidents
(Marshall, 1987). In the following part of the section the most dangerous technical parts
are under view.
Hoses, loading arms and their connections
Most of the accidents during the cargo loading/discharging are related to wrong handling
of hoses. The result can be very tragic. An accident in Landskrona, Sweden shows that.
On the 16th of January in 1976, a French tanker started to discharge 533 tons of
anhydrous ammonia. The liquid ammonia hose ruptured, and a large cloud of liquid
ammonia released. The master and the chief mate who happened to be close to the
transfer died. The reason for the accident was a rude violation of existing rules. The used
hose was suitable for propane and butane but not for anhydrous ammonia. The pressure
was too strong and the hose broke (HCB, 1999).
Even the development of hoses has been significant during last decade, changing from
metallic to thermoplastic composite, they still demand very careful handling (Barber,
1985). Hoses must be checked visually before every connection operation (ISGOTT,
1996). A pressure tests must be done after specific intervals, depends on the
manufacturers recommendations (ISGOTT, 1996). In addition, as the tanker falls and
rises during the loading operations, strain on the hoses must be avoided.
Nowadays the most popular hose construction material is polypropylene
(thermoplastic composite hose). It is resistant to organic and inorganic acids, alkalis,
hydrocarbons and all solvents (Barber, 1985). In addition, they are lighter and more
flexible to pressure ratings (Barber, 1985). At the same time metallic hoses are more
suitable for transporting liquid chemicals with temperature up to 60°C (Barber, 1985).
The alternative to hoses is to use more safe loading arms. They have many
benefits. First, a loading arm can be used to transport many different chemicals. Second,
they are more flexible to pressure. Third, chemicals cannot contaminate metal. In
addition to these advantages, the cargo throughput can increase as a loading arms’
diameter is bigger (Simpson, 1985). The advantages of the before mentioned factors
have been lead to a situation where most of the developed ports use loading arms. For
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instance, Malmö’s oil port uses in most cases chicksans (Horck, 1999). The
disadvantage of the loading arm is their price and dimensions. As loading arms are
specifically designed to the specific terminal taking into account the elevation changes
(resulting from the tide, freeboard of smallest and largest tanker for which the berth is
intended), the price is expensive. Although they take a lot of space. In many terminals
30-50 lines are installed side by side on quay. Tanker manifold can contain similar
number of flanges. Very often some of them are used simultaneously. So the space is
important.
The other area which must be under the careful attention, are connections between
terminal’s hoses and ship’s manifolds. Spills and leakage from connections are mainly
caused in three reasons which are following:
1. Flanges of ship manifolds and terminal’s pipelines does not fit because of different
standards.
2. Poor conditions of flanges in terminals and on vessels
3. Terminal workers negligence to close correctly bolted connections.
Pressure in pipelines
The strength of pipelines must be equal to the pump speed. When terminals want to
increase their loading rate more powerful pumps are used. The increased pressure inside
lines can cause broke of it. A similar danger is when during the discharging process a
tanker’s pumps are used (Horck, 2000). Very often vessels’ equipment is more powerful
than the terminals’ capacity to handle the product. A shipowner who is interested in
spending less time in the port wants to use the maximum potential of his equipment. To
avoid dangers caused by high pressure during the loading/discharging operation an
agreement must be exchanged between the terminal and tanker regarding pump speed,
flow rate and the rate of valve closure.
Insulation system
Some chemicals like kerosene, natural gasoline, jet fuel, heating oil, and lubricating oil
are characterised as an accumulators of static electricity. Their loading and discharging
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process presents fire and explosion hazards and to avoid the danger, necessary
precautions must be taken into consideration.
Static electricity generates during the discharging and loading of cargo. The
tanker and berth establish galvanic element because of their potential differences. The
loading arm or hose closes the electrical circuit. A spark can be created when the loading
arm is connected or disconnected. To avoid a spark a bonding wire or an insulated
flange in loading arm construction is used.
Research has proved that bonding wire connections between the ship and the berth have
been impracticable and even dangerous. IMO suggests in its Recommendations on the
Safe Transport of Dangerous Cargoes and Related Activities in Port Areas (paragraph
8.3.4.1) to finish using the bonding wire. Today most big terminals do not use the
bonding wire any more (Horck, 2000).
In Estonia the situation is confusing. The national law does not prefer one solution to
another. Though designers of terminals use regulations of different countries, which
sometimes prefer the use of bonding wire other time insulated flange. There have been
situations where the designer demands the use of bonding wire even the terminal
operator has bought already modern and more safe insulated flange. The mixture of
different systems is the worst solution which does not increase safety.
Not only loading equipment but also any electrical equipment can be a source of
spark, though safety regulations over technical equipment must be established in the
territory of a terminal. Although the safety zone must be created in the vicinity of tanker
and loading equipment where the use of mobile phones and portable radio stations is
prohibited (ISGOTT, 1996).
5.3.4 Training of personnel
The Greek shipowner P. Livanos has said:” Tankers do not carry oil safe, people do.”
Awareness of the danger of harmful substances and skills to handle them in a proper
way are the main clues to avoid accidents and pollution. IMO has established training
regulations both to crew of tankers and terminal operators. In the following part training
requirements for seafarers and terminal workers are under the view.
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Seafarers
STCW 95 obliges a tanker’s crew to complete a tanker familiarisation course, which
introduces different cargo characteristics and hazards. In addition, a shore-based fire
fighting course must be attended. Later training depends on, whether the crew works on
board an oil tanker or a chemical carrier (STCW 95, section A-V/1).
Terminal operators
IMO recommends dividing the training concerning the handling of dangerous goods into
three parts.
First, every person who is involved in the transportation and handling of harmful
substances should receive general familiarisation training. Second, function-specific
training to persons concerning requirements, which are applicable to the tasks he
performs. Third, safety training to persons regarding risks, which can happen when he
performs duties.
It is not enough than people just know regulations, they must also understand the
importance of them. Lets take containerised dangerous goods as an example. The
consignee who opens the container does not know in what condition is the cargo inside
it. His safety depends on, whether the freight forwarder did his job properly or not.
Though, the training of terminal workers is extremely essential.
The author’s idea is that cargo securing training programs must also include field
training where participants unload not properly secured containers with damaged cargo.
Only examples from real life help workers to understand the importance of packing.
This should avoid them violating the rules later.
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CHAPTER 6
INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS OF TRANSPORTING
AND STORING OF DANGEROUS GOODS
The transport and handling of dangerous cargo is regulated with different
international legislative acts. The chapter describes the aims of international
legislation and shows why the world needs it. In addition, the overview is given of
the development of regulations and main different organisations responsible for
establishing them. Finally, as the number of pages in the dissertation is limited then
the chapter analyses only these codes and directives which consist significant
weaknesses.
6.1 The need for international legislation
“Chemicals themselves do not cause any danger; wrong handling does” (J-A.
Johnsson).
The main aim of the legislation concerning handling of dangerous substances
is to prevent accidents to persons or property and damage to the environment. As
most accidents happen during incorrect transport and handling operations legislative
acts regulate mainly this area.
The importance of the existence of safety rules shows the pollution incident
in the Tisza River at the end of February in 2000. The Romanian mines, run by an
Australian company, used exploitation technology which was prohibited in most
European countries except Romania. The result was that an extremely poisonous
substance, cyanide, was spilled into the river, causing the contamination of water and
the death of 130 tonnes of fish. The accident happened because Romania had not
implemented environment protection rules. This situation was used by the mining
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industry, which saw a possibility to increase their profit without spending money on
environmental friendly technology.
The accident emphasises two aspects.
1. There will be soon or later any accidents when the State does not regulate and
control handling of dangerous goods.
2. Every private company is interested in profit making. They follow safety and
environmental protection rules as much as is demanded in national rules.
The regulations concerning dangerous substances must be strict to eliminate
pollution possibilities but at the same time not to impede the movement of goods.
The significance of that point has increased during the last decades when the nature
of trade has become more international. Nowadays cargo moves through many
countries crossing several borders and use different modes of transport. As the
carriage of goods by sea and by land is different then each transport mode needs
special regulations. The fact that freight container rolls and pitches 60,000 times
during the crossing of the Atlantic shows that big stresses affect the cargo on board.
Though, in maritime transport special factors like wind and sea forces, temperature
changes and no shore assistance in case of emergency must be taken into
consideration to ensure safety.
Today there is a situation where different states accept different standards.
From the transport company’s point of view it is a complicated situation. It can cause
confusion or misunderstandings and finally lead to dangerous situation.
To show the complexity of international transport from Europe to Asia
following example from Ms Haldis Fearn- a Director of Hazardous Material in APL
is used.
A chemical cargo classified as 3.1 under IMDG Code is shipped from
Hamburg to Hong Kong. As there is no direct trip to Hong Kong the cargo is
reloaded in Singapore but before that the vessel makes a stop in Jedallah (Saudi
Arabia). The shipper knows that the goods must be packaged according to the IMDG
Code. To his surprise it is told that to move the cargo from the depot to the Hamburg
port by land transport, extra ADR or RID rules (depends on the transport modules
selected) must be followed. Even the IMDG Code and ADR/RID harmonise more or
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less, there are still in case of some substances differences. In the worst case it means
that the cargo must be packed according to ADR/RID first and later in the port
repacked according to the IMDG Code. The next surprise comes in Jedallah, Saudi
Arabia. Even the State recognises the IMDG Code, their local regulations must be
followed. One Saudi Arabian rule is that dangerous substances moving to the country
should be clarified with the port prior to arriving. There is possibility that local
authorities demand additional safety measures (package, labelling, segregation).
Similar situations repeat exactly in Singapore and in the final destination, Hong
Kong, where permission to unload the cargo must be given by local authorities. And
again, Hong- Kong land transport safety rules should be followed to move the cargo
from the port to the consignee.
To minimise this kind of complexity of trading as much as possible, but at the
same time increase the safety of transportation, all countries must work towards the
harmonisation of their legislation. Today this is possible through the implementation
of international regulations. International Conventions and Codes are like guidelines,
which equalise different countries’ legislation. At the same time, from the transport
company’s point of view, they make cargo movement easier because no need to
repack or label in border of different states.
In the maritime transportation a harmonisation is achieved through the IMDG Code.
In Europe the ADR/RID regulates land transport. The next aim must be
harmonisation between land and sea transport modes.
6.2 History of legislation
Legislation has regulated the transport of dangerous substances since the
beginning of the development of industry. The first piece of legislation of dangerous
goods in the world were the British Merchant Shipping Act of 1894. It covered
substances as gunpowder, aqua fortis, naphta, nitroglycerine and lucifer matches
(James, ). The act was more related to the preservation of ships and lives onboard
than the protection of the environment. Many years later, a Brittish Standing
Advisory Committee was formed to advise the President of the Board of Trade on
the carriage of dangerous goods. The report the committee published in 1933 came to
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be known as UK Blue Book. It was a publication which contained several hundreds
of chemical substances and instructions on how to handle them.
In the USA the first regulation “Explosives and Combustible Act “was drawn up
in 1908 (Corkhill, 1991). The rule was addressed to explosives and highly flammable
liquids. Later new classes were added.
The destiny of two countries’ legislatve acts have been different. In the UK the Blue
Book was unvalued in 1990 (Rawson, 1994). USA‘s regulations are still based on
their local standards.
The first international regulation attempting to govern the carriage of
dangerous cargoes were SOLAS 1914 (Henry, 1985). The Convention prohibited the
carriage of goods which of their nature, quantity or mode of stowage endangered
lives of the passenger and the safety of ship. This Convention was never entered into
force. A second attempt to revive the earlier regulation was SOLAS 1929. In the
convention life saving appliances and dangerous goods were put under the same
rubric (Henry, 1985). Both SOLAS 1914 and SOLAS 1929 left to each
administration to determine which goods were dangerous and what were precaution
measures (Henry, 1985). The Convention entered into force in 1933. In the 1940-s
the traffic of dangerous substances by sea increased significantly to satisfy the postwar industry’s needs. Ships started to face problems they never had before. The new
SOLAS 1948 represented already new way of thinking. The convention included a
chapter covering dangerous goods which said that dangerous substances should be
identified on the basis of their characteristics. The Convention also recognized the
need for international uniformity in safety precautions and recommended that labels
must be developed to indicating the kind of danger presented by each class of goods
(Henry, 1985).
6.3 Different international organisations and their legislation
There are many organisations in the industry which deal with dangerous
goods. The UN, IMO, ILO, CMI, and UNCTAD are the international organisations
which have dealt with the regulation of world shipping, establishing international
conventions for half a century. In addition to international regulations, the number
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and the importance of regulations based on regional agreements or unilateral
implementation has increased significantly in recent years. The European Union is
playing a bigger role than ever in that field. The legislation of the Community of the
most powerful European states affects more countries than belonging to that region.
Refusing to follow EU rules means that this huge market is closed to outsiders.
Similar situation is in the USA, where very strict pollution control measures have
been established and ship does not follow them are not allowed to enter the country’s
territorial water. In addition, Australia has implemented unilaterally regulations of
restriction of ballast water discharge and Baltic Sea coastal states have their own
rules for transporting trailers loaded with dangerous goods on board of ro-ro ships.
This kind of situation is caused because of IMO’s slowness in environment
protection areas which makes some developed states unsatisfied. The previous
statement is proved by the following quotation found from the EU directive 94/63
concerning volatile organic compound emissions:
“ Standards must be drawn up at IMO level for vapour control and recovery systems
to apply to both loading installations and ships. Whereas the MARPOL Convention
is not so revised, the Community, after discussion with its major trading partners,
should propose appropriate measures to apply to ships and port installations
servicing ships.
Unilateral and regional measures have caused stresses between the IMO on one side
and the EU or the United States on the other side. The IMO supporters’ point of
view is that the US and the EU decisions basis on political decisions which are the
result of the pressure of pollution affected areas (Farthing & Brownrigg, 1997). The
contra argument heard at the IMO MEPC meeting after the “Erika “ accident, said
by the representative of the European Commission was that nobody has right to stop
the EU as an independent institution to protect its environment.
It is impossible to say that regional regulations are good or bad. It depends on the
way they are drafted and how they affect the maritime industry. Generally, when
regulations have been established there is a need for them. The author’s point of view
is that economically developed large countries such as the USA and the European
Union can establish local measures without any negative impact to their economy.
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They are big markets and shipowners cannot ignore them. For instance, unlimited
liability introduced in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 in the USA, has not caused the
boycott of the US ports by tanker owners even that kind of speculations were
expressed. Moreover, after some time, similar rules are proved by IMO (tanker
double hull is an example) and made mandatory all over the world.
This dissertation concentrates mainly on conventions, codes and directives
established by United Nations and its specialised agency the International Maritime
Organisation, also the European Union and Helsinki Commission. In addition, the
Baltic MOU of ro-ro transport of dangerous goods is under view.
6.3.1 United Nations and its legislation
The United Nations has a leading role in international regulation for the
transport of chemicals. The organisation has published several legislative acts. In
1956, “ Recommendations for the Transportation of Dangerous Goods”, which is
known as the “Orange book” were published by the Committee of experts of the
Economic and Social Council. The ultimate aim of the publication was to unify
world- wide all modes of transport. The ”Orange Book” covers classification and
numeration of dangerous chemicals, also packaging and labelling requirements to
transport hazardous substances. The “Orange book” is addressed primarily to
international regulatory authorities in order to promote harmonisation of regulations
of different transport modes. The book is renewed every two years.
Today the “Orange book” is the basis of the most countries’ legislation related to
dangerous goods. An exceptions are the United States which legislation basis the
local standards grown up from the 1908 year “Explosive and Combustible Act” and
in some way the European Union.
A second Convention adopted by the UN in the Conference on the Carriage
of Goods by Sea in 1978 was the Hamburg Rules. The Convention deals with private
law matters and its provisions are commercial. Article 13 still concerns dangerous
goods as it orders the shipper to mark or label these packages. The weakness of the
Convention is that the Hamburg Rules do not define dangerous goods (Henry, 1985).
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A third UN legislative act was the Convention on International Multimodal Transport
of Goods. It also makes reference to the carriage of dangerous cargo. Article 23 is
exactly the same as in the Hamburg Rules’ article 13, only instead of the term
“shipper” “consignee” is used.
6.3.2 IMO, strengths and weaknesses
A UN specialised agency International Maritime Organization is a main legislative
body which deals mainly with maritime matters on the international level. 157
member states are represented in the organisation. The legislation worked out by the
IMO is extremely relevant and fairly good. This has achieved by two reasons:
1.Regulations have been worked out by the experts of the field. Politicians’ role and
influence on the working groups are not significant.
2. Every member states’ opinion and suggestion has been taken into consideration
during the regulation drafting process.
At the same time, from the environmental protection point of view, it seems to the
author that the organisation is one step back from real needs. This is caused because
of the complexity of the IMO procedures to update the legislation. Usually it takes so
long time and when it is finally done the world already needs something else.
From the author’s point of view the following list includes the main weaknesses of
the IMO. These are following:
•

“Highest practicable standards”

Different member states have different political and economical interests.
IMO’s wish that its legislation must satisfy everybody has caused a situation
where the pollution prevention legislation basis on not very high standards.
Generally taking into consideration everybody’s opinion is acceptable but not
in case of environment protection. “Highest practicable standards” is an
attitude which shows the old manner of thought and is in contradiction with
manners of thinking where the environment is not a negotiable topic.
•

Complicated requirements of adoption of legislation

IMO treaties enter into force after a specific number of member states who
own the majority of world tonnage (usually 50%) have ratified them. For
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instance, when main flag states like Liberia and Panama, who own 17% and
13% of the world fleet decide to boycott some convention then there is a real
possibility that it never enter into force (The Torremolinos International
Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels) or the ratification period takes
years. The best example is MARPOL Convention. The treaty was adopted
already in 1973. It required ratification by 15 States with a combined fleet of
50 % of the world’s gross tonnage. By 1976 only three States with less than
1% of the world tonnage had ratified MARPOL. Only in 1983 the first annex
from fifth of this really important convention entered into force.
•

Most of the treaties related to dangerous cargo transport and handling are
codes or recommendations which roles are to be only a guidelines for
governments.

•

Although IMO Conventions do not cover vessels in the cabotage trade.

6.3.3 The European Union, its strengths and weaknesses
The European Union is a community of 15 of the most developed European
countries. The European Commission, seated in Brussels, is the policy- making body.
It formulates the proposals for legislation and monitors the implementation of
regulations in the member states. The commission consists of 23 directorates
covering different areas like transport, environment etc.
European Commission laws can take three following forms:
Regulations are the most stringent type of legislative measures. They enter
into force with immediate effect and require compliance with the overall objectives
and describe procedures on how the objectives should be achieved. (Examples of
regulations are the ruling of cabotage and the elimination of boarder control).
Directives have a binding effect with respect to objectives. The procedures to
achieve the result depends on individual member states. Directives usually include
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deadlines by which they must be implemented. All regulations dealing with
dangerous cargo are directives.
A decisions’ aim is to impose requirements of an individual nature, usually
they may be issued against a specific company.
The European Commission is political body, it means that their decisions are also
political. This fact sometimes makes following their rules quite complicated.
The European Commission’s intention is to see the end of substandard ships
operating in Community waters. A big concern of safety and environmental
protection matters have efforted the European Union to establish their own extra
legislation. The biggest difference between the IMO and the European Union’s
regulations is obligation. The strength of the EU law is that, when IMO regulations
are not mandatory to member states, then the European Commission does not allow
this kind of attitude at all. Everything decided in Brussels is binding in every member
state. The second advantage is that the EU legislation establishes high standards. The
EU policy is that environment protection is not a negotiable topic. As the European
Commission is a political body, its decisions are affected by political pressure
resulting that sometimes technical aspects are not taken into consideration. Almost
every directive concerning dangerous substances includes some weaknesses. One
reason is that the number of experts whose opinion is taken into consideration during
the drafting of regulation is not so big as in the IMO. This can cause a situation
where some significant aspects can be forgotten and not added to the regulations.
6.3.4 Helsinki Commission
The wish to protect the unique marine life of the Baltic Sea and growing
awareness that national measures alone are not sufficient to protect the environment
nine coastal states Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Russia and Sweden adopted the Helsinki Convention. The first Convention was
signed in 1974 and second version in 1992. These Acts cover all sources of pollution
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both from land and from ships. A Helsinki Commission- Baltic Marine Environment
Protection Commission- known as HELCOM is the governing body of the
Convention. It meets usually annually, but from time to time meetings are held at
ministerial level. Decisions taken by the Commission are regarded as
Recommendations and must be incorporated into national legislation of the member
states (source). Some Recommendations are related to transport of dangerous
cargoes. The HELCOM has chosen a different way to regulate dangerous cargo
transport with the aim to protect marine pollution. Instead of establishing new
regulations, the organisation has taken some relevant acts from the IMO and the EU
and obliges member states to implement them.
6.4 IMO legislation, its weaknesses
The IMO’s work has been significant to change the maritime transportation of
dangerous goods more safe. The organization has established SOLAS and MARPOL
Conventions, BC and IMDG Codes, and also “Recommendations on the Safe
Transport of Dangerous Cargoes and Related Activities in Port Areas. In this
paragraph only the IMDG Code is under the view as the code has fallen under some
critics.
6.4.1 IMDG Code
Resolution 65, adopted at the 1960 SOLAS Conference, recommended that
Governments adopt a uniform code for the carriage of dangerous goods by sea which
must supplement the SOLAS chapter VII. By 1965 IMO’s Maritime Safety
Committee’s working group on the carriage of dangerous cargo prepared the
document known as the IMDG Code. It covered such matters as packaging,
stowage, and labelling. All information based on the UN’s “Orange book”. One of
the main reasons for the development of the Code was the trend towards
containerisation (Henry, 1985). The use of freight containers reduced the physical
hazards. However, dangers related to careless or improper packing of TEU-s stayed.
As the SOLAS, so the IMDG Code has undergone many changes, both in appearance
and content to keep pace with chemical industry. The IMDG Code has been
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successful through its existence. This is proved by the fact that few incidents have
occurred with properly stowed cargo.
Weaknesses of the IMDG Code
Even if the IMDG Code has been successful it is not perfect. The
publication’s four volumes are not designed to be user friendly. The code also needs
continuous renewing because of the development of new substances by the chemical
industry. Existing IMDG Code design is not very comprehensible. Four books are
very heavy and very uncomfortable to carry. The code also differs from the UN
model regulations and other transport modes rules. However, amendment 30 will
reformat the code radically. The code which will come into force on January 1, 2001,
consists of two A4 bound volumes which makes it similar to the UN’s “Orange
book” and other transport modal codes. The new problem is that bound version will
not be capable of being updated as previous one. Thus, users are forced to buy new
books after every amendment. This makes the cost of the code very expensive.
The Code is amended 29 times already during its existence and the process
continues. Incident on board of the vessel “Wealthy River” in 1995 confirms the
need of renewing. The container, which contained thiourea dioxide overheated and
combusted itself. The chemical emitted dense fumes of sulphurous gases. Four
people on board became ill and one was hospitalised. The sad side of the incident
was that the crew and freight forwarder who packed the container did not do
anything wrong; all safety stowage and segregation rules were followed. The only
thing was that the thirourea dioxide was considered as non-hazardous and was not
regulated by IMDG Code (Compton,1996).
The second issue is, whether the IMDG Code must be mandatory or not. Of
course, after being familiar with the facts about the incident on board of the vessel
“Asian Freighter” every reader feels anger and wishes that the IMO will take proper
steps to avoid this kind of accident in the future. The incident itself was the
following. On a voyage across the North Atlantic, four seafarers were sent to the
holds to check the lashing. In one of the holds they were all overcome by fumes of
arsine gas to such a degree that they had to be sent immediately to the hospital. The
fumes came from a container which was not labelled and the arsine gas cylinders
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inside it were not declared. The ship, therefore, did not know that they were there.
The punch line of the story is that no one of these affected men died. The accident
happened in 1974 but in 1992 two of them were still on life support machines
(Compton, 1999).
The main advantage of a mandatory IMDG Code is that when rules are
compulsory, companies have to follow them and the vast majority of enterprise does.
The risk of accidents decreases. In case of the code will stay on recommendations
level there is always a chance that companies will not follow suggestions. IMO has
planed to make the IMDG Code mandatory and the suggested date will be 1st of
January 2002 (Compton, 1999). There will be similar question in many readers’
heads of why the IMO did not make the Code already mandatory when it was
adopted? The basic reason in 1965 was that the Code was not intended to remain
static as new substances were increasingly carried by the sea (Henry, 1985). The
status of the Code gives possibility to make changes quickly and easily without
asking agreement with parties. Supporters of the not mandatory IMDG Code say that
when the Code will be transformed into a Convention or by making it a part of some
other treaty (like SOLAS and ISM Code) then the process of making amendments
gets longer but the IMDG Code needs very operate changes. This is not exactly true.
IMDG Code amendments are not so operative at all. Usually it is amended every two
years. Proposals go through the DSC Committee which meets once per year and the
Maritime Safety Committee (after that it takes up to a year to prepare them for
publication). In addition, the transitional period is 6 months before they enter into
force. In case the IMDG Code is a Convention, the “tacit acceptance” procedure is
sufficiently quick (6 months) to make amendments to the Code at the same speed as
they have done now.
The real problem is that the IMDG Code is divided into two parts. The ship
side regulates vessels and their operations, shore side port work and packing
technology. At the same time the IMO is set up to regulate only the sea- side. It
means that the organisation is not able to make the shore side part obligatory and
cargo originators who are situated on shore are excluded. The result is that containers
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and trailers on board can be properly stored but what is inside it depends on the
freight forwarder’s conscience. Though the danger of accident remains.
A solution is when IMO cannot legally change the IMDG Code mandatory,
some other alternative organisation must be found. The UN specialised agency
International Labour Organisation (ILO) is a theoretical possibility. One possibility is
that the IMDG Code should be added into the ILO convention 152 dealing with the
health and safety of dockworkers. Unfortunately, in practice, ILO does not have the
same status and effect as IMO. This is proved by the fact that only 18 states have
ratified ILO 152 Convention during 20 year (Compton, 1999).
There is also another side of the coin. A mandatory IMDG Code causes a big
mess in the tank and packing industry. When the IMDG Code bases on the UN
“Orange book” then the USA and some EU legislative acts are related to local
standards, which are quite different from the UN’s (numeration, constructional
requirements for tanks, containers). Compulsory IMDG Code changes in cargo
packing and transport impossible in these countries. The only solution is that these
countries must harmonise their legislation to UN standards. This is a very long term
process. The EU is working towards it, changing differences between the IMDG
Code and the ADR/RID. The USA, even if they are interested in it, it is quite
impossible because of the opposition of local shippers.
In conclusion, it seems that it is not possible to make the all IMDG Code compulsory
at the international level using the IMO machinery. But there is also more bright
side. Approximately 47 States owning more than 86 % of world fleet have declared
to the IMO that the IMDG Code is part of their national law. It obliges countries
which have not implemented the IMDG Code to follow the regulations; otherwise,
their ships are detained in these 47 states’ ports.
6.5 European Union’s legislation
The European Commission has established since the beginning of its
existence six directives related to dangerous cargo. All of them have been criticised.
In this paragraph they are looked at more closely.
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Council Directive 93/75
“Minimum requirements for vessels bound for or leaving Community ports and
carrying dangerous or polluting goods.”
The legislative act covers vessels bound for or leaving a Community port
carrying dangerous or polluting goods onboard. The directive requires the ship
operators to give a full list of cargo either to the competent authority of the
Community port of departure or the first port of arrival if coming from a port outside
the European Union. In case of accident the authorities of the affected area must find
out the ship’s departure port and contact the competent authorities who own relevant
data related to the cargo.
Weaknesses of the directive:
The main weaknesses of the directive are high implementation cost and the
content of irrelevant paragraphs. Maritime administrations and port authorities wish
to implement to the Hazmat directive means that they have to develop computer
systems, which connect all ports inside the state and is linked to other countries’
similar systems.
The directive also includes unimportant articles which are not related to
transport of dangerous goods. For instance, article 8 states:
The master of the vessel shall complete truly and accurately a check list as
reproduced in annex II to this directive and make it available to the pilot for his
information and competent authority, if it so requests.
The check list is a three page long document, including questions about the vessel,
technical equipment and certificates of the crew.
The second paragraph of the same article says:
Pilots engaged in berthing, unberthing, or manoeuvring vessel shall immediately
inform competent authority whenever they learn there are deficiencies which may
prejudice the safe navigation of the vessel.
From the author’s point of view the article is irrelevant for the following reasons:
1. It is not related to the transportation of dangerous goods.
2. Safety suffers as the master cannot concentrate on navigation but has to write
papers. A similar thing is with the pilot. Instead of doing his work he must
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control the check list and his main work, to navigate ship safely to the port,
suffer.
3. Control of certificates and ship’s technical condition is port state control’s job,
not pilots’.
Council Directive 94/63
“Control of volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions resulting from the
storage of petrol and its distribution from terminals to service stations.”
The directive demands member states to establish extra safety requirements for
storage installations at terminals to reduce emissions of environmentally harmful
hydrocarbon vapours. The provisions of the law are designed to reduce the total
annual loss of petroleum resulting from loading and storage of installed tanks below
the target reference value of 0.01 weight by weight % of the annual throughput. The
loss of petrol during the loading and unloading mobile containers at terminal must be
below the value of 0.005 weight by weight % of the annual throughput.
Strength and weakness of vapour recovery systems
From the environmental protection and safety point of view the requirements in the
directive are very useful as they decrease the air pollution and danger of explosion.
Floating roof with primary seal around it reduces evaporation to 1 tonne per 10,000
tonne and vapour recovery unit 1 ton per 20,000 tonnes. From the operational point
of view terminal operators do not get any benefit. Despite the claims of equipment
manufacturers there is no profit in vapour recovery. This idea was also presented by
Mr Nils Bergander from the Port of Gothenburg and Ms Kai Ingman from Neste
Engineering (HCB, February 1996). The reason is that vapour recovery systems
require heavy investments and only some terminals which handle high value
products in huge quantities may realise more attractive economics for vapour
recovery (Warshaw, 1995). To build up a recovery systems additional pipelines,
pumps and other protection devices will be needed. The other problem is land area.
Based on Mr B. Warshaw’s (1995) calculations, a total land area for recovery
systems would be 275m2 for a single berth. Although one type of recovery
equipment cannot keep control over emissions from all VOC-s. Different chemicals
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need different technology. There is a danger when European Commission will
establish similar requirements for crude oil and other chemicals as petrol lots of
terminals lose flexibility and are forced to handle only one type of cargo (Hartless,
1996).
Council Directive 96/35
“The appointment and vocational qualification of safety advisers for the
transport of dangerous goods by road, rail and inland water.”
The directive requires member states to introduce regulations mandating the training
and employment of safety advisers by all whose involved in the transport of
dangerous goods. Even the title does not mention maritime transport the port sector
is included as the meeting point of land and sea transport.
Weaknesses of the directive:
It is self- evident that companies involved in the handling of dangerous goods should
have somebody on the pay- roll who is familiar with existing rules. Despite that the
directive has found negative impact from the industry. The main reason is that the act
is based on a decision to increase safety and protect the environment but, technical
and logical aspects on how to achieve it have not taken into consideration. The
document establishes very strict requirements to transport companies, but at the same
time does not cover storing terminals at all.
The article 1 states that, since 31 December 1999, any transport company engaged in
the transport of dangerous goods must hire a safety advisor.
In some cases transport companies are not engaged in the loading and discharging
process at all, as they move packed cargo only from one point to another. In this case
there is no need to hire a safety adviser. The same article says that companies
dealing with loading and unloading must appoint a safety advisor.
The clause is very general and changes situation ridiculous. According to the law a
chemist’s shop which sells aerosols must also hire a safety advisor when the shop
assistant helps to unload the cargo from the delivery van.
When the directive covers all possible and impossible transporting and loading cases,
it does not mention storing companies, which can be the main sources of danger, at
all.
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The second unclear part of the directive is related to the examination and certification
of safety advisers (article 5 and annex II of the directive). The document demands
that the examination must include all kind of modes of transportation, different types
of cargo and classes of chemicals. This is too much. The safety advisor of a bulk
terminal does not need packaging skills and the safety advisor of a company which
deals with one or two types of chemical substances does not need to know anything
about all different classes of chemicals.
The only ones who can benefit from the directive are training organisations. It is
estimated that only in UK there are already 12,000 persons who need safety advisor
training. The fact that the safety advisor must renew his certificate after every five
year, taking a refresh course (article 6) only proves that fact. It seems that the
European Commission has given a training organisations wonderful possibility not to
worry about their future.
Council Directive 96/82
“The control of major accident hazards involving dangerous substances.”
(Seveso II)
The directive was established as a result of Flixborough and Seveso accident. The
act was renewed in 1996 after the fire in a warehouse in Basel, Switzerland. The
directive specifies certain substances and minimum quantities of any of these
chemicals stored in plants (lower and top tier). Minimum amounts vary from two
tonnes to up to thousands of tonnes.
Examples of substances covered by the directive and the two tier levels are the
following:
1. Automotive petrol and other petroleum spirits:
2. Ammonium nitrate (contains nitrogen more than 28%):

5000/50000 tonnes
350/2500 tonnes

3. Phosphorus trihydride (phosphine)

0.2/1 tonnes

4. Arsenic trihydride (arsine)

0.2/1 tonnes

On the basis of the amount of substances the directive divides enterprises into
categories where different safety measures are required. In the lower tier the operator
must take specific measures as prepare major accident prevention policy to prevent
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major accidents. The policy includes organisational structure, responsibilities and
procedures for implementing safety management system.
In the top tier, the operator must submit the safety report before the construction
work of the terminal or plant starts.
Weaknesses of the directive
The directive distinguishes long term and intermediate temporary storage. According
to article 4 the intermediate storage is excluded. The actual words used to describe
the exclusion are following:
The transport of dangerous substances and intermediate temporary storage by road,
rail, internal waterways, sea or air, outside the establishments covered by this
Directive, including loading and unloading and transport to and from another means
of transport at docks, wharves or marshalling yards;
Long term storage in the port area is covered when amounts trigger lower or higher
tier quantities.
It is difficult to understand the difference between intermediate and long time storage
and the need to divide it. The European Commission also realised this problem and
carried out an investigation to find out what kind of legal provisions exist concerning
the safe transport and temporary storage in a port. They found that only existing rule
was the IMO’s “Recommendations on the Safe Transport of Dangerous Cargoes and
Related Activities in Port Areas”. The Commission decided that this was enough and
there was no need to change the directive (Compton, 1999). From the author’s point
of view, distinguishing these two definitions is wrong because of two reasons.
Firstly, five of ten largest accidental man- made explosions happened in ports
(Compton, 1999). From the point of safety a substance is also dangerous if it is
stored in an area for a short time.
Secondly, IMO’s “Recommendations on the Safe Transport of Dangerous Cargoes
and Related Activities in Port Areas” are only guidelines and implemented into local
legislation by small number of IMO member states.
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The following two directives must be looked together as from the maritime
safety point of view they have similar weaknesses.
Council Directive 94/55
“Approximation of the laws of the member states with regard to the transport
of dangerous goods by road.”
Obligates member states to implement the rules of the European Agreement
concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR)
established by the UN Agency Economic Commission in order to harmonise traffic
inside the community.
Council Directive 96/49
“Approximation of the laws of the member states with regard to the transport
of dangerous goods by rail.”
The directive lays down uniform safety rules for the transport of dangerous goods
basis on Regulations Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by
Rail (RID) established by the Intergovernmental Organisation for International
Carriage by Rail (OTIF).
The weakness: lack of harmonisation between the IMDG Code and the ADR/RID.
The biggest weakness of the ADR/RID agreements from the maritime industry’s
point of view, is the lack of smooth transition from land transport to maritime
transport. Today, when multimodal transport plays a significant role in cargo
movement, it can be a crucial factor.
The differences start from the point that the ADR/RID technical requirements
for trucks, wagons, tanks and packages are designed for stresses experienced in land
transport which are absolutely different from stresses encountered at sea. The IMDG
Code section 17 of General Introduction divides portable tanks and tank containers
into different classes according to the types of goods they contain. IMO types 1, 2
and 5 are permitted to transport on board the vessel. Type 4, which is approved to
transport of dangerous goods by the ADR regulations and used widely in land
transport, is prohibited to loaded on ro-ro vessels, or when loaded, then transported
only on short voyages.

62

Because of the different construction requirements of the tanks certain
substances are not permitted to be carried on ro-ro vessels. IMO type 1 and 2
portable tanks apply to liquids and type 5 is for the carriage of non-refrigerated
pressure liquefiable gases. According to that powdery substances, deeply refrigerated
gases or gases liquefied under pressure cannot be transported on ro-ro vessels.
(Busch, 1986). Although, the ADR/RID requirements for marking and labelling
cargo units are different. According to the ADR/RID no need to put placards on
every side of the transport unit, the IMDG Code still demands that. Finally, the
ADR/RID do not require that small quantities of dangerous substances inside the
trailer or container must be declared and marked. In contrast, at sea any exceptions
are not available.
6.6 Helsinki Commission’s regulations
Member states of the Helsinki Commission have established large number of
Recommendations, five of which are related to the transport of dangerous cargo. As
most of them recommend to adopt and implement the IMO and EU legislation, then
the author does not concentrate on their analyse. List of recommendations can be
found in annex 7.
6.7 Memorandum of Understanding for the Transportation of Dangerous Goods
in the Baltic Sea
Ro-ro ferries have found an important role in the cargo transport chain. The Baltic
Sea states regard ferry transport as being a continuation of road and rail journey.
Unfortunately, different requirements for land transport (ADR/RID) and for sea
transport (IMDG Code) described in the previous paragraph, makes transition from
one mode of transport to another difficult.
For that reason the Baltic Sea States of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Poland
and Sweden have signed the “Memorandum of Understanding for the Transportation
of Dangerous Goods in the Baltic Sea” which establishes rules on how to move road
tank vehicles, wagons and containers designed to land transport by sea. The
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memorandum divides voyages on the Baltic into short and long. According to the
section 6 of the agreement short voyages are:
“trade between ports south of a line Scaw-Lysekil and within sheltered area of the
western part of the Baltic west of the longitude 15°E, or east of longitude 15°E on
those routes agreed by competent authorities”.
In long voyages freight containers, swap bodies, vehicles and railway wagons
must be classified, packed, labelled, documented, towed and segregated either in
accordance with the IMDG Code or labelled according to the ADR/RID but
classified, packed, documented, towed and segregated according to the IMDG Code
(section 5). In short voyages, small amounts of dangerous goods inside packages or
large amounts in tanks can be classified, labelled, packed, and mixed according to
ADR/RID regulations. Actually this means that without any preparations in the port,
vehicles may be loaded directly onto ro-ro ships. This rule gives transport companies
a good possibility to save money from extra labelling and packing. There is no need
to mark all four sides of the trailer and fill out extra documents. Though, the MOU
gives the possibility to avoid complexity which is caused of the lack of
harmonization between international maritime and land transport agreements.
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CHAPTER 7
TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS GOODS IN ESTONIA
Through Estonian ports a significant amount of liquid dangerous goods is
transhipped which careless handling can cause disasters with severe consequences.
The wish to avoid danger to the local population and the environment has forced the
Government of Estonia to ratify international agreements and establish local
regulations covering transport and storing of harmful substances. The chapter
describes what Estonia has done to change the handling of chemicals more safe and
how successful its efforts have been. The author gives an overview of main
organisations dealing with transport of hazardous materials, analyses the weaknesses
of existing legislative acts and describes how these regulations work in reality.
Finally, the main aim which should be achieved in the near future is added to the
chapter.
7.1 Accidents with dangerous goods in Estonia
Accidents with dangerous goods have also happened in Estonia. During the year
1999 there were two incidents related to the transport and storage of dangerous cargo
in Estonia. Both of them were caused because of the violation of safety rules. In
May, 19 a fire was discovered on the car deck of the Viking Line’s passenger ferry
“Cinderella” sailing from Tallinn to Helsinki. 5.5 tonnes of charcoal (UN no. 1361,
class 4.2) and 50 kg of matches (class 4.1) loaded on to the Estonian trailer burned. It
took the crew an hour to get the fire under control. The incident was caused because
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the freight forwarder company violated the following IMDG Code rules:
1. The charcoal and matches were not declared as dangerous cargo
2. The trailer was not labelled according to the IMDG Code rules
3. Segregation rules were not followed as matches and charcoal were stored closer
to each other than 3 metres inside the trailer.
The fire on board of the “Cinderella” was not the first incident with charcoal. Two
other similar cargoes had burned down in the Paldiski harbour waiting loading into
the ro-ro vessel.
The second accident happened in September, when a large amount of cacao
ignited in a storehouse in Paljassaare harbour belonging to the organisation “Port of
Tallinn”. The fire extinguishing operation took several days. Cacao is not directly
mentioned in the IMDG Code but it goes under the definition of seedcake, containing
more than 10% of oil (UN no 1386, class 4.2). For that class special precaution
measures like good ventilation and control of air temperature must be taken into
account. In this case these safety rules were violated.
Violations of safety regulations are quite common in Estonia. If to add
contradictions inside Estonian national law, the lack of knowledge and the
negligence of people working in that field it is possible to predict similar accidents
also continue in the future.
7.2 Estonia and international organisations and agreements
First steps Estonia did to make the transportation and handling of dangerous goods
safer in the state’s territory, was the participation in different international
organisations’ work and ratification of their conventions and agreements.
Firstly, since 1991 when Estonia got the official status of the International
Maritime Organization’s member state, the country has ratified all organization’s
regulations related to the transport and storing of dangerous goods. Secondly, as a
member of the Helsinki Convention, Estonian has converted the organization’s
recommendations to its national law. Thirdly, as Estonian official policy is to achieve
a status of Member State of the European Union as soon as possible, a great
emphasise is put on the implementation of European Commission directives.
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In addition to these organizations, Estonia is also a member of “The memorandum of
Understanding for the Transportation of Dangerous Goods in the Baltic Sea”, which
gives the right to transport railway wagons, road trailers and trucks on HelsinkiTallinn route using the ADR/RID regulations instead of the IMDG Code. In addition,
the mutual obligations between the terminal and the tanker, and the use of checklist
printed in the ISGOTT publication have been made obligatory through the Estonian
local port rules.
7.3 Legislative and controlling organisations in Estonia
The Maritime Department of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communication and the Hazardous Cargo Division of the Estonian Maritime Board
are the main organisations which deal with legislating and controlling of handling of
dangerous cargoes. Personal selection and lack of qualified specialists obstruct the
effective work of these institutions.
The Maritime Department is the legislative body which objectives are developing of
a merchant shipping policy, establishing regulations increasing maritime safety
including transport of dangerous cargoes by all modes and the handling of hazardous
substances in port areas. Implementation of these objectives demand special
maritime knowledge, especially when the country’s official policy is a creation of a
business friendly environment. Legislation drafters must be very careful not to
decrease the safety part for the benefit of business activity. Unfortunately, there is
not any seafaring background person left in the Ministry and only one clerk has a
maritime education as a WMU Master’s Degree. This is the result of a new trend in
the government’s politics where middle- aged persons with maritime background and
experience have replaced with young generation of general legal or economical
knowledge. From the author’s point of view shipping and maritime economics are
areas where are very difficult to manage without specific experience and knowledge.
Otherwise, it will lead soon or later to a decrease in the quality of decisions and
legislative acts.
The main task of the Hazardous Cargo Division in the Maritime
Administration is to keep control over the implementation of regulations concerning
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the handling of dangerous cargo in ports and transport at sea. The task contains the
following objectives:
•

control over implementation of national legislation in ports

•

control dangerous cargo securing on board of vessels

•

inspection of ships, issue certificates

•

information collection, keeping statistics database

•

establishing regulations

•
Although the list of tasks is long, only two officers are employed by the
administration. Physically they are not able to carry out most of these duties. Another
problem is related to education of officers. A chemical engineering background
without any maritime knowledge or seafaring experience can not be sufficient to
control cargo securing on board and inspection of ships. They do not have any
knowledge about ship’s construction and seafaring.
The only solution for how to improve the effectiveness of the Maritime Department
and the Hazardous Cargo Division is to increase the number of employees with
maritime backgrounds and seafaring experience. Their knowledge will help draft
effective legislative acts and find out violations of regulations on vessels and in
ports.
7.4 Existing regulations concerning dangerous goods
Three years ago the main way to escape from the liability was to emphasise the
lack of regulations. In the year 2000 this excuse does not help any more because the
area is covered with different acts. The list of regulations is included to annex 8.
7.5 Non-conformity in Estonian regulations
As the transport and handling of dangerous goods contain different aspects,
specialists from four different ministries were used to draft legislation. Unfortunately
this has caused the situation where the texts of two legislative acts contain
contradictions.
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On the bases of article 11 in the Chemical Act and paragraph 14 in the Port
Act the Ministry of Transportation and Communication is obliged to establish
requirements for the handling of dangerous goods in port areas. The regulation of the
Ministry

of

Transportation

and

Communication

bases

on

the

IMO’s

recommendations and is titled “The requirements for receipt, processing and
storage of dangerous goods in ports”. At the same time the Ministry of Social
Affairs worked out the legislative act “The requirements for recording dangerous
chemicals in enterprises liable to be affected by a major accident”, bases on
chapter 10 of the Chemical Act. This document also covers ports because, according
to the regulation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the “Port of Tallinn” and all port
operator companies are defined as enterprises liable to be affected by major
accidents. Therefore, two ministries have worked out recording requirements for the
same enterprises.
The contradictions between these two legislative acts can be found in paragraphs
dealing with recording harmful substances in port areas. Paragraph 3.3 of the
“Requirements for receipt, processing and storage of dangerous goods in ports”
states that:
All dangerous goods must be recorded in the port territory. The record of the
dangerous goods must include:
1.Quantity
2.Correct technical name
3.UN number
4.Location in the port
5.Details of arrival and departure
The Clerks from the Ministry of Social Affairs are not familiar with IMO
documentation and do not know about existing national law. Their final draft is
different and states following:
The operator must keep the record of dangerous goods when they are stored more
than 24 hours. The record must include following information:
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1.Quantity
2.Correct technical name
3.EINECS (European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substance),
ELINICS (European List of Notified Chemical Substance) or CAS (Chemical
Abstract Service) number.
Compare of these documents shows three differences. These are difference in time
limitation for storage of dangerous cargo, obligation to record the location of
dangerous cargo in the territory and use of different numeration of harmful
substances.
Time limitation
Because of the liner shipping schedule and the high cost of time, cargo moves
to the port territory shortly before the ship’s departure and leaves soon after the
vessel’s arrival. A 24- hour limitation separates ferry terminals out of list of
enterprises, which must record chemicals’ movements even when the amount is big.
It does not mean that dangerous substances are less dangerous. Even short period can
be enough to cause an accident. Exactly this happened in the Paldiski harbour where
two trailers carrying charcoal burned down just waiting loading on board of ro-ro
ship.
Location of cargo
When the operator does not have an overview of where substances are stored
in the territory, they can be stored too close to each other causing the violation of
segregation rules. Furthermore, in case of fire or explosion, there is no possibility to
define the burning substances as the packages can be damaged and the response team
has no idea what kind of response or precaution measures they must take into
account.
Numeration
An UN number of chemical is established by the international organisation
and is used world wide in transport business. The IMDG Code, the main tool in
every port and ship, bases on UN numeration. Although all cargo manifests and
safety documents related to harmful substances contains UN numbers. The idea to
demand Estonian port operators to keep records of chemicals using different
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numeration is pure bureaucracy which causes extra time losses. Moreover, use of
different numerations’ affects safety, when some documents use CAS, others
EINECS and third ELINICS numerations, in the case of emergency it is very
difficult to define possible hazards very quickly.
Solution
From the author’s point of view, the regulation established by the Ministry of
Transport and Communication is more beneficial than the Ministry of Social Affairs’
as it avoids bureaucracy of using different numeration, obliges to keep control over
cargo stored in port territory and does not exclude any terminal.
With aim to stop non-conformity between two legislative acts following changes
should be done in the regulation 6 of the Ministry of Social Affairs.
Firstly, cancel 24 hour limitation to storage.
Secondly, the use of the UN numeration must be compulsory, other numeration
system can be used on voluntary bases.
Thirdly, dangerous substances storage location in the port area must be immediately
recorded after arrival to the territory and deleted after leave the area.
Finally, the record list must be accessible 24 hours.
In addition to the contradiction, both legislative acts have other weakness. They
do not regulate the form of the record document. According to the regulation of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, both the “Port of Tallinn” and every port operator
company working on the territory of the “Port of Tallinn” must keep a record of
dangerous substances stored in its territory. As the form of the document is not
regulated, every operator company uses their own form. It makes the Port of Tallinn
Authority’s task to maintain a dangerous cargo database, bases on the information
received from operators, very complicated and time consuming as they have to
rewrite all collected information.
In annex 7 there are examples of three record lists by three port operators sent to the
port authority. They all use different forms. For instance, one operator follows the
standards of the Ministry of Transport and Communication, other standards of
Ministry of Social Affairs and the third does not follow any standards at all.
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7.6 Violation of the existing regulations
Violations of existing regulations are common in Estonian ports concerning
both cargo transportation and storing. The main reason is that persons responsible for
safety in port are not employed or do not do their work properly.
7.6.1 Violations of regulations related to transport of dangerous cargo to/from ports
by sea and by land
7.6.1.1 Containers
The paragraph 3.5.1 of the requirements for receipt, processing and storage of
dangerous goods in ports states:
“Placards must be taken off after discharging cargo units.”
A short visit to the container terminal in the “Port of Muuga” showed that placards
were not removed every time. The author saw two empty containers carrying
placards. The terminal safety adviser’s comment was that these containers would be
used to transport the same cargo and there was no need to remove old markings. The
explanation has been accepted by the Maritime Administration.
From the author’s point of view this kind of situation must be avoided as it can cause
accidents, confusion and waste of time.
•

Firstly, if containers are labelled they must be stored on board according to the
IMDG Code segregation rules. This makes cargo-storing operation more
complicated as crew must draw up the cargo loading plan taking into
consideration empty but marked containers.

•

Secondly, in case of accident the response team observes labels on containers and
acts on the bases of them. It means that they waste time and sources to protect
labelled but empty containers.

•

Thirdly, if some labelled containers contain dangerous goods and some not, then
it is very easy to mix them up. There is a risk that loaded containers are handled
without taking caution measures written in the IMDG Code into account. The
result can be disaster.
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Solutions
The only way to avoid violations of labelling is to increase the control over
containers in port terminals. Although, the extra training of workers can be done. In
case violations continue operator company must be punished.
7.6.1.2 Railway tanks
Transport of dangerous goods by rail is regulated by the Agreement on
International Railway Trade. Despite the existing legislation violations still exist.
Incorrect labelling of railway tank wagons

carrying oil products is the main

violation. The problem is significant with wagons loaded on the Estonian side. Trains
arriving from Russian oil refineries are marked properly. These wagons which are
loaded with chemicals at Estonian port terminals do not carry often any labels. The
interesting fact is that terminals are aware of violations. Moreover, the violation of
labelling rule is intentional and done because of security reasons. Wagons are parked
often in remote areas where it is very difficult to keep an eye on them. Wagons
loaded with petrol are very valuable. Correctly marked tank wagons will rise the
interests of criminals and increase the risk of theft.
The terminal employers’ opinion was that labels did not increase safety significantly.
According to them the alternative way was to keep all relevant documents related to
every wagon and its cargo in the cabin of the locomotive. In case of any incident the
response team can find them there. This attitude is wrong. Many accidents happen
because of two trains’ collision. In these cases railway-engines are completely
damaged and it is impossible to find any documents inside them.
Solution
The freight forwarders’ threat to lose valuable cargo in Estonia is understandable as
the risk of theft is high. It still does not give right to violate safety regulations and put
human life and environment in danger. There are three ways to increase wagons’
security.
1. Wagons’ stop-cocks and hatches must be locked well. Unfortunately, there is a
danger. Thieves are ready to use force to break any locking system. This can
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cause a situation where, after opening, it is impossible to close stop-cocks. The
result will be pollution of the environment or even disaster.
2. Wagons must be parked in protected areas surrounded with fence and secured by
respected security company.
3. During establishing cargo movement’s logistic plan long stops in theft sensitive
areas must be avoided.
It is clear that all precaution measures cannot avoid theft attempts 100% and always
it is not possible to follow these rules but generally the number of losses decrease.

7.6.2 Violations related regulations related to advanced notices
Paragraph 2.6 of the “The requirements for receipt, processing and storage of
dangerous goods in ports” says:
Harbour Master’s office must be notified of the arrival of dangerous goods both by
land and sea at least 24 hours in advance.
Paragraph 2.8 says
Copies of advanced notices must be kept 10 year.
In addition, Paragraph 2.9 states
Harbour master must be informed about the time the cargo leaves the territory.
This information is needed to give the port authorities overview of cargo transported
through the port territory and to prepare safety measures in case of accidents. A
survey done in March 1997 showed that advanced notice system did not work in
some ports and the harbour master was not informed about the cargo in the port
territory. Otherwise, how to explain the situation when harbour’s transport control
officer from the harbour master office had no idea about the containers containing
dangerous goods laying on the quay and the stevedore company which handled them
(Arro, 1999). In developed countries it causes a scandal when list of dangerous cargo
on port areas is not accessible for one hour. In Estonia nobody cares even when the
list does not exist at all. This information must be in the harbour master office, it is
not enough when only the operator owns data. For instance, let’s assume that as
accident with a transport unit happens at night, response team need quickly
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information but it is impossible to find the employee of the stevedore company who
has relevant information about the cargo inside it.
Other possibility, the office of operator company where the data is kept is usually
situates in the territory of the storing area. In case of fire or explosion the access to it
is eliminated.
To avoid loss of time in case of accident the data must be duplicated and kept in
different places. The harbour master’s office is the best place as it works 24 hours
annually and usually situates far from storing area.
Storing cargo in the port territory
The obligations related to the storage of dangerous goods in the port is regulated by
two acts: “The requirements for receipt, processing and storage of dangerous goods
in ports” and “Requirements for the recording of dangerous chemicals in enterprises
liable to be affected by a major accident”. The contradiction between them related to
recording data was already in a previous chapter. In this part the right to access to the
data is under the view.
The aim of collecting data is to find out the quantities of cargo stored and
transported through the area. On the bases of the data possible dangers can be
defined and contingency plans established. Analyse is done by governmental
authorities. Therefore, representatives of the authority must have access to private
companies’ databases. The right is written in the paragraph 4.2.2 of “The
requirements for receipt, processing and storage of dangerous goods in ports” which
says following:
Overview of movement of dangerous goods must be available in case of request of
auditors or supervisor officers.
“The requirements for the recording of dangerous chemicals in enterprises liable to
be affected by a major accident” from the Ministry of Social Affair demands even
more. According to it:
After the 1st February every year the annual summary of stored dangerous goods
must be available to the supervision officer.
Unfortunately these clauses do not work in any Estonian ports. The landlord port
system which has proved to be successful in increasing ports’ turn- round is an
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obstructive factor of information exchange. Private companies do not give records of
harmful substances to the port authorities even port regulations demand it. The
following is a fragment from the port regulation:
Operator companies must submit a quarterly report concerning the movement of
dangerous goods through the port area to the Harbour Master by the 10th day of the
following month of the quarter.
A survey done in February 1999 by the Estonian Maritime Administration showed
that in three ports out of four under the control of the “Port of Tallinn” the authorities
did not have statistics of dangerous cargo movements. Thus, supervisor officers
cannot get information even if they want it.
7.6.3 Violations related regulations concerning Safety adviser
According to Estonian regulations port companies must hire a person who is
responsible for the handling of dangerous goods.
Chapter 4 paragraph 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 in the “ The requirements for receipt, processing
and storage of dangerous goods in ports” states:
“port authorities and terminal operators must hire employee who is responsible of
handling of dangerous cargoes.”
His duties are defined in the paragraph 4.2
-

organising transport and handling of dangerous cargoes in the port territory
controlling documentation related to dangerous substances (advanced notices,

record of substances).
-

keeping record of dangerous goods stored in the territory of the port.
The importance of safety adviser increases as the number and amount of

dangerous substances handled in ports increase year by year. Though, the companies
cannot quarantee safe operations without hire somebody with specific skills and
knowledge. Still it seems that port authorities do not take their obligations related to
safety and environmental protection very seriously yet. They officially have a person
in every port office who should deal with these matters. Unfortunately, according to
the survey done in February 1999 by the Maritime Administration very often the
responsible persons have not adequate knowledge about existing regulations and do
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not know what is going on in the port territory. Though, they are not able to
implement their duties. It seems that persons hired to that jobs are useless to the port
authority. Instead of get rid of them the jobs related to safety is offered to them with
the aim to let them nicely spend time until the official retirement. In private
terminals, the person who is responsible for dangerous goods has many other tasks.
Safety is just one which is very often marked only on paper.
Solution
To make responsible person work more effective, the Maritime Administration must
take the following steps and change the regulations:
•

The responsible person must deal with duties directly related to dangerous goods.

•

The responsible person qualification and compulsory training courses must be
clearly defined.

•

The responsible person must be examined from time to time by the Maritime
Administration.

As all these requirements are defined already in the EC Directive 96/35 (safety
adviser), probably the situation will change when the directive 96/35 is implemented
in Estonia.
7.7 Main targets
As Estonia wants to join the European Union it must implement all existing
directives. Unfortunately the existing situation concerning recording hazardous cargo
movement makes implementation of the EC Directive 93/75 (Hazmat) impossible.
The first step the state must do is to establish computer based network which
connects all ports and the maritime administration. The idea is that all ships arriving
at the country’s port give relevant information concerning cargo (correct technical
name, UN number, IMO hazard class, the quantity, location on board) to the harbour
master office. The port is also obliged to keep data about the cargo stored in the
territory. Usually it is kept in a computer. The port database is directly linked to the
Maritime Administration’s server. They are informed at all times about any
hazardous cargo passing ports. The system gives many advantages. Firstly, in the
case of accident, response service officers can get information about the cargo on
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board of the ship and their following steps depend on that. Secondly, hazardous
cargo inspectors working for the Maritime Administration have a good overview of
arriving ships and their cargo. They can plan their inspections when they know that
some cargo is entering the port. This kind of systems already exist in many countries.
For example, Finland has established their “Port@net” and it has proved to be very
effective. A similar system works in Hamburg, Germany under the name “Dakosy”.
The establishment of an effectively working net demands not only on technical
development but also changes in existing legislation. The national law, in the case of
Estonia must be “The requirements for receipt, processing and storage of dangerous
goods in ports”, must oblige to record all dangerous cargoes in the maritime
administration. In addition, the law must demand that all dangerous cargoes are
electronically registered in ports.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The term “dangerous cargo” includes hundreds of substances both solid,
liquid and bulk forms. These chemicals can be very harmful to human health and the
environment. The damaging effect of these substances vary considerably, mostly
depends on their type, amount and toxic content. People whose work is related
harmful cargo must be familiar with physical and chemical criteria of different
substances. They must understand the danger which chemicals can cause when
safety regulations are violated.
Keeping of safety of dangerous cargo needs cooperation between the
transportation industry and governmental institutions. The first step is that
responsible persons must get exact statistics of cargo moves through ports. After that
possible dangers can be identified and contingency plan established. In this field
Estonia has to do a big work as today responsible organisations have not accurate
overview of dangerous cargo movement.
It is known fact that accidents with dangerous cargo never diappear as long
the cargo is transported. There are still possibilities to decrease the risk of incidents.
Implementing of environmental friendly management, encouraging use of modern
technology and training of people are the key issues which help to change handling
of dangerous goods significantly safe.
International organizations play an important role in regulating to transport
and handling of harmful cargo. Even they have done good job, there is no reason to
be satisfied. Firstly, the biggest problem is the lack of harmonisation of regulations
of different modes of transportation. The importance of multimodal transport has
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increased quicker than development of legislation. The UN, its specialized
organizations, European Commission and the US responsible institutions must
increase their efforts to harmonise different requirements. Otherwise, existing
requirements start to obstruct world trade.
Secondly, the IMO should find a way to make IMDG Code obligatory. In
addition, speed of updating the legislation must be increased and the environmental
protection can not be a negotiable topic where “highest practicable standars” are
permitted. The European Commission, opposite, is quick and effective. The
environmental protection is not negotiable topic and rules are compulsory to
everybody. The weakness of the EU legislation is that directives very often bases on
political decisions which makes them sometimes too strict. It seems to the author that
really good regulations will be established when the IMO and the European
Commission study from each other and take over their strengths side.
Estonia is doing first steps towards safety of transportation and storing of
dangerous cargo. As most of the legislation already exists then the state must
dedicate its efforts to implementing and enforcement
simultaneous work in all three fields guarantee that transport of dangerous goods is
not so dangerous any more.
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Annex 1
Summary of chemicals transported in the Baltic Sea
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF CHEMICALS

TRANSPORTED IN THE BALTIC SEA

SUBSTANCE

LISTING BY CATEGORY
CATEGORY A
coal far
Creosote
alpha-methyl styrene
acetone cyanohydrme
Naphtalene
TML/TEIbutyl toluene
butyl benzyl phfialate
vinyl toluene
solvents, cat A
ethyl aaylate
dibutyl phtalate
CATEGORY B
styrene monomer
ethylene dichloride
coal tar naphta solvent
phew
acrylonitrile
tall oil
white spirit
buthylaldehyde
carbon tetracloride
solvents, cat B
chlorobenzene

UN-NO
CATEGORY

A
1999 A
1334 A
2303 A
1541 A
2304 A
1649 A
266 A
A
2618 A
A
191 A
A
B
2055 B
1184 B
2553 B
2312 B
1093 B
B
1300 B
1129 B
1846 B
B
1134 B
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QUANTITY
TONS

198171
153957
22797
9592
3590
2646
1554
1400
1299
475
466
200
195
707024
110472
92768
87313
78700
69221
69118
63831
33811
19000
17614
12953

SUMMARY OF CHEMICALS

TRANSPORTED IN THE BALTIC SEA

SUBSTANCE

LISTING BY CATEGORY
isopropylbenzene
turpentine
trichloroethylene
lub oil additives
nonene
trimethylbenzene
buy acrylafie
isodecyl alcohol
trichloroethane
tetrachloroethane
crotonaldehyde
pinene
propylene dichloride
tetrachloroethylene
CATEGORY C
pyrolysis gasoline
sulphuric acid
xylene
benzene/toluene/xylene mixtures
benzene
nitric acid
ethyl hexanol
Huosilicic acid
pyrolysis waste mixtures
toluene
aniline
benrine, aromat
potassium hydroxide solution
vinyl acetate
tall oil fatty acid
solvents, cat C
hexane
butyl acefiate
ethylbenzene
octanol
cyclohexane
toluene diioscyanafie
dipentene
heptane
ethylenediamine
ammonia aqueous
2-ethoxyethyl acetate
1,3-pentadiene
sodium borohydride
formaldehyde
propylamine
nonyl alcohol
amyl acetate
methylamyl alcohol
CATEGORY D
sodium hydroxide solution
phosphoric acid
vegetable oils
methyl tert-butyl ether
ethylene glycol

UN-NO
CATEGORY

1918
1299
1710
1257
2325
2348
28318
1702
1143
2368
12798
1897
_
1830
130
1114
2031
1778
1294
1574
1115
1814
1301

1208
1123
1175
1986
1145
2078
2052
1206
1604
2672
1172

1198
1277
1104
2053
182A
1805
2398

88

B
B
B
(B)
B
B
B
(B)
B
B
B
(8)
C
(C)
C
C
(C)
C
C
(C) .
(C)
(C)
C
C
(C)
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
D
D
D
D
D
D

QUANTITY
TONS

12060
9534
5774
5347
4700
3964
2540
2440
1350
1036
1030
898
850
700
2226483
477376
472164
409695
345243
90130
74510
63782
43844
39537
37382
31039
22799
20282
16019
10979
10801
8425
8101
7910
7120
6573
4l 80
3112
2890
2656
2485
1666
1206
1198
1000
1000
679
436
264
1696271
703957
4279
172538
98490
43743

SUMMARY OF CHEMICALS

TRANSPORTED IN THE BALTIC SEA

SUBSTANCE

UN-NO
CATEGORY

LISTING BY CATEGORY
Latex
Acetic acid
methyl ethyl ketone
Achloromeihane
formic acid
calcium chloride solution
ethyl acetate
cyclohexanone
urea, ammonium nitrate solution
fatty acids
methyl pro pyI ketone
2-ethoxyemanol
fish oil
sodium hydroxide solution, spent
methyl methacrylate
propionic acid
diisodecyl phtalate
ethyl propionate
pyridine
ethylene glycol acetate
diethyleneglycol iso-butyl ether
methyl iso6utyl ketone
ethylene glycol methyl ether
aminoethylethanolamine
2-ethylhexanoic acid
acetic anhydride
amyl alcohol
ethanolomine
hexanol
propylene glycol methyl ether
butylene glycol
APPENDIX III SUBSTANCES
methyl alcohol
ethyl alcohol
butyl alcohol
acetone
iso64 alcohol
isopropyl alcohol
glycerine
dioctyl phtalate
propylene glycol
paraffin wax
vegetable protein solution
diethylene glycol
sthy!ene glycol butyl ether
GASES
ammonia
propane
butane
propylene
vinyl chloride
butadiene
ethylene
LPG
eth chloride

D
2789
1193
1593
1779
1173
1915

1249
1171

1247
1848
1195
1282

1245
1188

1715
1105
2491
2282

1230
1170
1120
1090
1212
1219

2369
1005
1978
1011
1077
1086
1010
1038
1075
1037
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D
D
D
D
(D)
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
App III
App III
App III
App III
App III
App III
App III
App III
App III
App III
App III
App III
App III
App III
Gas
Gas
gas.
Gas
Gas
Gas
Gas
Gas
Gas

QUANTITY
TONS

39413
32676
26540
24223
20804
18165
17983
10980
10100
9935
7408
7235
5822
3926
2260
2189
1704
1651
1100
931
915
571
525
510
444
397
382
284
209
180
104
1045218
747545
96924
54695
54307
27960
23188
16946
14026
7259
875
750
639
104
2845921
1427274
703630
243232
210329
110071
90772
56883
2570
1160

Annex 2

Overview of packed dangerous cargo transported in
the Baltic Sea
I TRANSPORTATION OF PACKAGED DANGEROUS GOODS, SUMMARY

Approximate values for one month, routes with more than 100 tons
Between ports

North Sea
North Sea
North Sea
North Sea
North Sea
North Sea
North Sea
North Sea
North Sea
North Sea
North Sea
North Sea
North Sea
Gothenburg
Gothenburg
Gothenburg
Gothenburg
Gothenburg
Gothenburg
Gothenburg
Copenhagen
Copenhagen
Copenhagen
Aarhus
Aarhus
Aarhus
Aalborg
Ebeltoft
Grenaa
Halsskov
Kors6r
Helsingborg
Helsingborg
Helsingborg
Helsingborg
Gedser
Puttgarden
TravemOnde
TravemOnde
TravemOnde

Per month
Tons Number

and Aalborg
and Copenhagen
and Gothenburg
and Hanko
and Helsingborg
and Helsinki
and Kiel
and Kotka
and Leningrad
and Rostock
and Uddevalla
and Varberg
and Wallhamn
and Copenhagen
and Fredrikshav
and Hanko
and Helsinki
and Kiel
and Kotka
and Tlavem(lnde
and Helsingborg
and Helsinki
and Malmd
and GdansWGdy
and Kalundborg
and Uddevalla
and Oskarshamn
and Zealand
and Hundestedt
and Knudahoved
and Nyborg
and Helsing6r
and Helsinki
and Kotka
and Turku
and WarnemOnde
and Rddby
and Gedser
and Hanko
and Helsinki

150
150
13300
350
600
60
1000
400
3900
750
240
600
700
100
1200
600
750
500
200
4200
6300
170
370
300
350
200
120
230
. 700
3800
12000
5100
280
290
120
800
5500
250
1500
4600

120
20
1100
10
50
10
120
30
1
50
25
1S
40
15
150
15
40
120
5
420
320
220
90
,1
20
1
5
30
50
250
1500
790
20
5
10
60
400
70
75
1000

Major
classes

Between ports

3,1
TravemOnde and Malm6
8
TravemOnde and Rauma
8,5,3
TravemQnde and Trelleborg
5,1
TravemOnde and Turku
8,3
Kiel/canal and Aalborg
8
Kiel/canal and Gdansk/Gdy
3,8
Kiel/canal and GAvle
5,8
Kiel/canal and Halmstad
9
Kiel/canal and Hamina
6,3
Kiel/canal and, Helsingborg
. 1,4
Kiel/canal and Helsinki
1
Kiel/canal and Kotka
8,3 .
Kiel/canal and Leningrad
3
Kiel/canal and MAlaren
3,2
Kiel/canal and Pori
; 5,1
Kiel/canal and Rauma
5,8
Kiel/canal and Riga
3,8
Kiel/canal and Stockholm
5
Kiel/canal and Sundsvall
3,2,5,8
Kiel/canal and Szczecin
3,6,8,4
Kiel/canal and Turku
3
Kiel/canal and Ventspils
8,9
Rostock
and Riga
5
Sassnitz
and Trelleborg
8
Swinoujscie and Ystad
4
Klaipeda
and Mukran
4,8
Nyniishamn
and Visby
8
Oskarsham
and Visby
3,4
Forsmark
and Ringhals
8,3,4
Gdansk/Gdy
and Helsinki
3,8,2,4
Gdansk
and MBlaren
3,8,9
Gdansk/Gdy
and Norrkdping
3,8
GdansWGdy
and Stockholm
5
Gdansk
and Uddevalia
3
Hargshamn
and Uusikaupunki
3,8
Stockholm
and Helsinki
3,6,2,8 Stockholm
and Turku
3
KapellskAr and Turku
2,3
Holmsund and Vaasa
358
Sundsvall and Vaasa
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Per month
Tons Number

Major
classes

3300
160
3200
100
100
16200
160
. 130
450
950
6000
140
2900
500
1100
130
720
600
750
5000
700
710
220
9400
1500
2000
100
400
200 1000
900
1000
350
500
1600
1800
3000
120
240
200

3,8,6
8
3,8,5
3
4,8
4,5,8
5
3
3
3,8
3,6,8,9
5
8,6
5
6,8
8
4,5
5,3
5
5,8
8,6
6
6
2,3,4,8
2,3
4,8
3,8
3,4
7
5,6
5
5
5
8
9,3,5
3,9,8
8,3
3
8
9

600
40
560
50
S
60
5
5
25
75
950
S
5
20
80
20
5
20
1
30
120
1
5
470
30
35
5
170
1
15
1
'S
1
1
200
230
330
25
15
15

Annex 3

Overview of Packed dangerous goods transported in the
Baltic Sea on ferry lines
Between Ports

Quantity
per month
In tons

Number Quantity
parcels per trip,
per month Average
tons
1200
160
4
50
15
0
30
15
0
4500
500
75
500
100
8
350
20
2
500
30
1
750
50
3
3900
250
6

Fredrikshavn
Grenaa
Grenaa
Gothenburg
Gothenburg
Aarhus
Ebeltoft
Grenaa
Halsskov

and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and

Gothenburg
Halmstad
Varberg
Travemunde
Kiel
Kalundborg
Zealand
Hundestedt
Knudshoved

Korsör
Copenhagen
Copenhagen
Helsingör
Malmö
Copenhagen
Gedser
Gedser
Puttgarden
Trelleborg
Rostock

and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and

Nyborg
Malmö
Helsingborg
Helsingborg
Travemunde
Rönne
Travemande
Warnemande
Rödby
TravemOnde
Trelleborg

12000
400
6300
5100
3300
8o
300
800
5500
3200
30

1500
100
330
800
600
40
70
70
400
600
1

13
1
10
1
28
5
2
7
9
21
0

Hanko
Helsinki
Sassnitz
Swinoujscie
Klaipeda
NynAshemn
Oskarshamn
Hargshamn
Helsinki
Kapellskar
Stockholm
Stockholm

and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and
and

Travemonde
TravemOnde
Trelleborg
Ystad
Mukran
Visby
Visby
Uusikaupunki
Stockholm
Turku
Turku
Tallinn

1500
4600
9400
1500
2000
200
400
1700
1800
100
3000
90

80
1000
480
30
40
10
160
200
230
30
350
3

25
77
31
5
67
2
7
14
15
1
12
10

Holmsund
Sundsvall

and Vaasa
and Vaasa
total

240
200
75520

20
20
8304

1
3
6

and
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Annex 4
List of Estonian enterprises defined as “liable to be affected by a major
accident” according to the European Council Directive 96/82.
•

Propaan AS

•

Tallinna Vesi AS

•

Port of Tallinn

•

Milstrand AS

•

Dry Bulk Terminal AS

•

Refetra AS

•

Ferry Terminal AS

•

Reola Gaas AS

•

Nitrofert AS

•

Silmet AS

•

Petkam AS

•

Euredeck AS

•

Nybit AS

•

Sonmarin AS

•

Pakterminal AS

•

Tartu Terminaal AS

•

Narva Vesi AS

•

OÜ Tarkoil Rakvere Terminaal

•

Kunda Nordic Cement AS

•

Rakvere Lihakombinaat AS
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ANNEX 5
Survey how “people in the streets” recognise dangerous cargo placards
The idea of the survey was to find out how many “people in the street” know
the meaning of hazardous substances placards. Twenty of selected people were not
directly involved in the transport business. Seven were females, thirteen males and
one for each sex was a child aged about ten year old. Four of the people were
possible regular users of hazardous materials as motor engineers and construction
builders. One was a retired fireman and the others were ordinary people. The
contestants of the survey were told that they were the first on the scene of a road
accident and they had to recognise the placards and give information about the cargo
to the rescue centre by phone. The research showed the general public has very little
awareness of the hazards that may be present during transport. The individual
findings were following:
No 1- explosives
•

Seven got right answer, saying it is the dynamite.

•

Four thought it was tar or oil

•

One thought it is beetles or spiders

•

One thought it is petrol

•

One thought it is splashes of dangerous substances as caustic soda

•

One thought it is cattle droppings

•

Five had no idea

No 3- inflammable liquids
•

Eleven thought it represented inflammable materials or goods (nobody made
difference between liquids and solids).

•

Five said fire hazards

•

Two said petrol
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•

One said highly inflammable material

•

One had no idea (fireman)

No 5- oxidising materials
This label caused more misunderstanding than others. Nobody got the right answer.
Participants had no real idea of the properties and reactions of oxidisers. Some
people associated the label with fire hazards. The results were the following:
•

Two thought it is inflammable chemicals

•

Two said tyres burning

•

One said grain fire

•

One said flammable when dry

•

One said inflammable solid

•

One said less flammable than class 3

•

One said not a fire hazard

•

One said inflammable materials

•

One said cannons

•

One said gas

•

One said explosives

•

Seven had no idea

No 6- poisons
This label was most recognisable.
•

16 said it is poison

•

One said it is dead bodies in the vehicle

•

One said acid

•

One had no idea

•

One said very dangerous substance
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No 6.1- harmful
The label proved to be very confusing. Most of the answers were related to
wheat.
•

Six said it was a wheat lorry or empty wheat lorry

•

Three said do not eat wheat

•

Two said danger of grain fire

•

Two said do not load foodstuff onto the lorry

•

One said do not open the lorry

•

One said not fit the consumption

•

One said nuclear energy

•

One said fertiliser

•

Three had no idea

No 8- corrosives
•

Seven said corrosives

•

Five said acids

•

Three said do not touch substances

•

Two said liquids that burns

•

One said do not drink

•

One said detergents or abrasives

•

One said non-dangerous chemicals
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Annex 6
List of accidents happen during handling and transport of dangerous chemicals
in different ports in 1999 (Hazardous Cargo Bulletin, 1999).
5 January, off Gibraltar
During the preparation for tank cleaning of the LPG carrier “Jessie Maersk” the
cloud of ammonia gas was discharged which drifted over Gibraltar.
5 January, off Khor Fakkan, United Arabic Emirates
The tanker “Athenian Pride” had explosion and fire after transfer of oil to another
tanker.
11 January, Puerto Rico
Vapour explosion in the cargo tank of the tanker “Athenian Fidelity” when the ship
was enroute to Venezuela in ballast. Five crewmembers were killed.
22 January, off Armutulu, Turkey
Explosion on board of the tanker “Marmara”, 2 crewmembers killed. Vessel had just
discharged 1000 tonnes of gasoline. Gas pressure was the main reason of the
accident.
7 February, Klaipeda, Lithuania
The tanker “Shuya” split unspecified amount of diesel oil to the harbour during the
loading operation.
9 February, Balanga Bataan, Philippines
The tanker “Bocaue” was struck by another tanker at Petro Refinery pier. Thousands
of tonnes of gasoline split into the water.
20 February, Gdansk, Poland
Explosion aboard the tanker”Panormos” during the tank cleaning. 11 dock workers
injured, it took 5 hours to extinguish the fire.
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26 March, off Abidjan, Cote d Ivoire
Explosion aboard the tanker “Cam Etinde” during hot work while the ship was
anchored waiting to enter port to load. Three cargo tanks damaged, four
crewmembers injured.
4 April, North Sea
The production/ storage tanker “Uisge Gorm” reported of pressure in the tank no 4.
Half of the crew was evacuated. To avoid the explosion vapours were let into the
atmosphere.
7 April, Jebel Ali, United Arabic Emirates
Flash fire in the cargo tank of the tanker “Affinity” during repairs, 3 workers killed.
Vessel was certified to be gas free after the discharge of cargo of carbon black.
13 April, Port Newark, New Jersey; USA
The cargo inspector was killed after falling into cargo tank fulfilled with acid aboard
chemical tanker “Stolt Innovation” Authorities suspect that he was overcome by
fumes or lack of oxygen and collapsed.
16 April, Salvador; Brazil
The tanker “Bage” discharging of oil cargo at Temadre terminal lost three mooring
lines, one 8-inch discharge line was connected and the result was the spill of 65 m3
of oil at sea.
24 April, Izmit Bay, Turkey
Two crewmembers died while cleaning cargo tanks of the chemical tanker
“Sapphire” after discharge of chemical cargo.
26 April, Auckland; New Zealand
The ro-ro vessel “Union Rotioti” lost 12 containers overboard, others broke on the
deck causing the leakage of chemicals. Possible reason: poor stowage.
7 May, Köln; Germany
Rhine barge “Avanti” caught in fire and exploded while loading naphtha at the
terminal. 300 tonnes of burning materials split to the river, fire spread to the empty
chemical barge moored next to it.
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13 May, Baja California, Mexico
Spillage during the fuel transfer process between the tanker and the offshore facility,
400m3 fuel oil was spilled
25 May, Rotterdam, the Netherland
Explosion aboard the tank barge “Aphrodite” during the loading benzene at the
terminal. The deck of the barge was damaged.
27 June, Puget Sound, Washington USA
Loading arm broke as tanker discharged oil to Tosco refinery, about 4000 tonnes of
oil split to the dock.
28 June, Port Stanvac, Australia
Faulty connection of floating hose used for discharge of oil to Mobil refinery blamed
for spillage of 270m3 crude oil to sea
10 July, eastern Mediterranean Sea
The containership “Jakarta” enroute Dalian to the North Africa had fire in one
container. Fire spread and other 100 other containers ignited. The crew abandoned
the ship.
12 August, Sydney, Australia
12 crewmembers were hospitalised after the report of chemical leak aboard the
containership “Direct Kookaburra”.
13 August, Amsterdam, the Netherland
The product tanker “Captain X Kyriakou” spilled 400 litres of gasoline while loading
at the terminal.
22 August, Berbera, Somalia
The tanker “Hodo II” caught fire while discharging fuel at oil terminal. Fire spread
quickly to the accommodation area. The investigation showed that the cargo pump
caused the fire.
23 August, off Kent, UK
The containership “Ever Decent” had fire in containers containing hazardous
materials after collision with the passenger ship “Norwegian Dream”.
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26 August, Point Fortin, Trinidad
During loading at berth the tanker “Senang Spirit” shifted away from the jetty,
bursting two 12-inches hoses and ripping 40- inch undersea line. 50 barrels oil lost at
sea.
24 September, off Dampier, Australia
60m3 of fuel oil split from the storage tank aboard Goodwyn- Aproduction platform
during transfer operation.
27 September, Port Dickson, Malaysia
Fire on board the tanker “Petro Stella” loading gasoline at Esso refinery jetty killed
one, injured another person. The explosion in forepeak tank blew 10- metre hole in
deck.
4 October, Zambles, Philippines
Explosion in the cargo tank of LPG tanker “Mundogas Europe” when it was prepared
for undocking after bottom hull repairs. Five workers killed, six injured.
27 October, Delaware River, Delaware; USA
15m3 of oil overflowed from the barge during loading at Motiva refinery dock.
5 November, Ravenna, Italy
Explosion on board of the oil/chemical tanker “Vincenzia” during repairs at Cantieri
Ravenna Dock, nine workers injured.
25 November, off Acruba, Dutch Antiles
Five crewmembers poisoned, two of them died because of oil vapours after
discharging of sulphur rich crude oil on the tanker “Volga”.
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Annex 7
List of Helsinki Commission’s recommendations concerning dangerous cargoes
Recommendation 1/3
“Concerning the adoption by the Baltic Sea states of the IMDG Code”
Recommends contracting parties to adopt IMDG Code to harmonise national
regulations in the Baltic Sea area.
Recommendation 1/13
“Requirements in respect of loading and unloading of harmful substances in
packed form”.
Emphasise dangers related to loading of dangerous goods,
Recommendation 12/7
“Special co-operation in case of chemical tanker accident in the Baltic Sea.”
Recommends to nominate a contact point through which the competent authorities in
other contracting parties can, in emergency situations, get information about the
chemicals carried by tankers bound for or leaving a port of the contracting party.
Suggests also help other contracting parties in case of pollution accidents.
Recommendation 19/15
“Minimum requirements for vessel bound for or leaving ports of the Baltic Sea
states and carrying dangerous or polluting goods.”
Make the European Directive 93/75 “HAZMAT” obligatory in the Baltic Sea area no
later than 1 January 2001. Weaknesses described in the previous paragraph.
Recommendation 19/18
“Reporting of incidents involving harmful substances on emergency dumping.”
Make the IMO resolution A. 648(16) obligatory in the Baltic Sea area.
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Annex 8
List of existing Estonian regulations concerning dangerous cargoes
1. The Port Act entered into force on the 1st of January 1998 and was drafted by the
Ministry of Transport and Communications. It is a basic document which
regulates port work and establishes rights to keep control over it.
2. Regulation no of 26 January 1998 of the Ministry of Transport and
Communication The requirements for receipt, processing and storage of
dangerous goods in ports. The document bases on IMO’s “Recommendations
on the Safe Transport of Dangerous Cargoes and Related Activities in Port
Areas” The act makes the IMDG Code, BC Code, IBC Code and IGC Code
compulsory in Estonia.
3. The Chemicals Act, adopted on the 6th of January 1998, is a document which
regulates the handling and transporting of dangerous substances in the territory of
Estonia.
4. Regulation no. 3 of 29 September 1998 of the Government of the Republic of
Estonia the Requirements for Petrol Transporting and Storing in Terminals
and Petrol Stations. The document bases on EU directive 94/63. It establishes
limitations of petrol vapour emissions into the atmosphere from port terminals.
5. Regulation no 15 of the Ministry of Economic Affairs Categories of Hazards
for Dangerous Enterprises and Instructions for the Calculations of the
Minimum Combined Hazard Levels of Chemicals, and the Threshold and
Maximum Quantities of Dangerous Chemicals for Enterprises Liable to be
Affected by a Major Accident. The document bases on the EU Directive 96/82
known as a Seveso II Directive.
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6. Regulation no 60 of 26 May 1999 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs List of
Enterprises Liable to be Affected by Major Accident.
7. Regulation no 6 of 11 December 1998 of the Ministry of Social Affairs
Requirements for Recording Dangerous Chemicals In Enterprises Liable to
be Affected By a Major Accident. The regulation entered into force on the 1
January, 1999. The act obliges enterprises to keep records of dangerous
substances stored in the territory of the company. It also gives controlling
authorities rights to access that data.
8. Regulationno 3 of the Ministry of Transport and Communication Requirements
for Vehicles Carrying Dangerous Goods in Estonian Roads. The act
makes
the ADR regulations compulsory.
9. The Act of Agreement on International Railway Trade ratified on the 5th of
June, 1992. It covers all previous Soviet Union territory and establishes
safety
rules for the transportation of dangerous substances for the railway.
10. Memorandum of Understanding for the Transportation of Dangerous Goods
in the Baltic Sea ratified on the 15 June 1998 and its special addition Agreement on
sea transport between Tallinn /Muuga and Helsinki ratified in 29 June 1999.
The act gives the right to follow ADR regulations instead of the IMDG Code on the
board of some ro-ro vessels sailing between Tallinn and Helsinki. This document is
added to annex 10.
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